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There are three reasons why the cost-benefit analyst who
appraised public undertakings(b.g., urban renewal) must be
concerned with distribution: (1) Statements about efficiency
entail assumptions about the basis of efficient activities, i.e.,
about the equity of a given distribution of income. As regards
public activities, where significant inequalities exist, there may
be no justification for distinguishing between merit wants, social
wants, and transfer payments. (2) Public allocative activities
necessakily cause a shift in the di'stribution of income, which,
depending on the analyst's evaluation of the original distribution,
nay or may not be desirable. Optimality criteri&twhinhtattempt't6 abstract
from distribution can lead to untenable conclusions ,because
by assuming that distribution is irrelevant they imply that it is
equitable. (3) A chief cause of the problems of cities is related
to the unequal distribution of income in the U.S.A. Those cities
in which urban renewal has been thought necessary have a much higher
proportion of impoverished individuals than do other political
entities at the local level. Any resuscitation of central cities
is depeidett upon eliminating poverty and radically diminishing
physical problems (e.g., pollution, congestion, lack of open space),
However, since the chief instrumental goal of urban renewal has
been to hold onto - or entice back - middle and upper income families,
the social diseconomies associated with pove'y have been exacerbated,
while the physical diseconomies have largely been ignored. At the
same time, suburbanites and exurbanities are not apt to return to
the city so long as a Vpost-industrial" infrastructure is not provided,
ie., until social and physical diseconoiies have been eliminated. Neddi
less to say, were such an infrastructure established, urban renewil
in its present form would be unneccesary - even for those who rationalize its
currently myopic course.
The significance of social time preference is that a high
rate of discount will militate against programs which have a long
gestation period, as any program which seeks to resolve the social
and physical problems ofi cities must. Social opportunity costs
should be a measure of the benefits foregone in not undertaking a
better project - vis-i-vis the analystlseschema of costs and benefits -
than the one which was in fact undertaken; and as such serves as
a suggestive critique of present programs.
A cost-benefit schema is presented which has two distinctive
characteristics: (1) all costs and genefits accruing to individuals
are considered; not soldy those which involve a cash-flow. (2)
Benefits and costs to individuals in different income groups are
weighted, That is, benefits which accrue to - and uncompensated
costs which are incurred by - low income families are deemed
respectively more and less desirable than they would be for higher
income families.
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CHAPTER ONE
SOME ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONCEAPTS
UNDERLYING COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
I. EFFICITICY V. EQUITY
Academic economists often beg the efficiency v. equity
dilemma by relegating it to the realm of non-problem (in a
footnote). Thus in a book on the urban transportation problem
one finds the following characteristic statement:
Since economic theory abstracts from value
judgments on the optimality of existing income
distributions, the question of whether an income
distribution should or could be improved by a
modification in the pricing structure is avoided. 1.
The question is whether in fact economic theory does abstract
from value judgment on the optimality of existing income
distribution, or whether - as we shall argue - it assumes
that the existing income distribution is optimal.
Clearly economic theory is based upon certain propositions
about the actual functioning and aim of theieconomic system.
The chief of these naturally has to do with the way in which
goods and services are given values. This proposition is often
stated in the following way: values are determined in accord
with consumer.'s sovereignty and consumer's sovereignty ought
to determine values. This proposition is somewhat redundant
in the sense that Hume's dictum "reason is and ought to be the
slave of the passions" is. For if X is the case, it is some-
what irrelevent that the observer also believes X ought to be
the case. Whereas if consumer's sovereignty does not prevail
there is an implied criticism of the status qu!o in maintaining
that it ought to.
The notion of the objective determination of values is
1.
2.
to be attacked on two levels: (1) consumer's sovereignty does
not exist, and (2) judgments about efficiency cannot be made
independently of judgments about distribution since the two are
interdependent.
Let us begin with the second of these, which asserts that
it is not true that economic theory abstracts from value judg-
ments about distribution. This can be shown without proving
that consumer's sovereignty does not exist, as Scitovsky has
done:
...society's preference as revealed by the market
are aggregated from the preferences of individuals
in such a way that each person's preferences are
weighted by his expenditures. And since the distrib-
:ution of expenditures depends on the distribution
of income and wealth, so does also the weighted
aggregate of consumer's preferences. The economist,
therefore, who accepts the standard of consumer's
preferences as revealed by the market has accepted
as given not only each individual's tastes but also
the distribution of income and wealth, which
determines the aggregation of these tastes. 2.
Joan Robinson carries this argument one step further in asserting
that "private property in the means of production, combined
with the rights of inheritance, produces a totally irrational
distribution of purchasing power within society".3 In any case,
the fact that distributional "value judgments depend upon
what is available for distribution, and the satisfactions
derived from a collection of goods depend upon the desires
generated by a particular distribution"4 implies that any
non-trivial statement about real income, efficiency, or social
welfare must include explicitly or implicitly some statement
about the real income position of individuals composing the
community.
The crux of the matter - especially so in cost-benefit
calculations - is that income refers to a collection of hetero-
geneous goods which are rendered homogeneous by wiighting them
by their market prices; these prices are the result of the
income distribution. Insofar as income is not equally distributed
(and demand includes not only willingness but ability to pay),
the process of consumer voting (to use the popular democratic
voting analogy) allows minority desires to be datisfied. As
Maurice Dobb has put it:
To the plain man it has always seemed absurd,
even disingeneous, to enunciate certain propos-
itions about the conditions of maximizing welfare
when it was clear to all that, with the existing
distribution of income, welfare could be increased
by deliberately violating these conditions (e.g.
by rationing scarce commodities and subsidizing
food and house-building while taxing luxuries). 5.
Given that values (or prices) are-inseparable fr6m a given
income distribution and to accept (reject) one is to accept
(reject) the other, there still remains the first assertion,
viz., that consumer's sovereignty does not exist. It has been
remarked upon by Galbraith 6, among others, that since economics
seeks a status of science its assumptions about reality are
considered by some practitioners to be immutable. While
"administered prices, fixed by the seller are the rule and
quasi-monopolistic conditions are universal" , textbook
economics still assumes the former to be the exception and
atomistic competition to be the rule. On the other side of the
coin, (almost) perfect knowledge, mobility, and freedom from
3.
4.
compulsidn are likewise bastions of textbook economics, while
again, the obyerse (viz. product differentiation, advertising,
built-in obsolescence) is the rule. In actuality the premises
of economics are boh value-laden and ideological, since, as
Myrdal has pointed out, they give "a scientific appearance to
an individualist, anti-interventionist prejudice".8 In a similar
vein (and presaging the spirit of our future arguments), Galbraith
has -written:
We do not have economic development in order
to make our surroundings more hideous, our culture
more meretricious, or our lives less complete...
those who must insist that this is what people
really want are those who most fear that, given
the opportunity, people would malge a different
choice - one that involves a greater measure of
social control of environment. 9.
5.
II. OPTIMALITY
In the final analysis, the raison d'etre of economics
lies in its ability to determine the optimum conditions-for
allocating resources. From what has been argued thus far, an
immediate paradox follows. Although it is claimed by some
economists that nothing can be said regarding the optimality
of the existing distribution of income, it is nevertheless the
case that most changes "in the allocation of resources, and
hence in the proportions in which different commodities are
supplied (and in the prices of these commodities), inevitably
alter the distribution of real income between different groups
of consumers". 1 0 Other economists have been acutely aware of
the efficiency-distribution problem. Little, e.g., has written
that "the question of income distribution is logically prior
to the question of the iddal output".11 In this section we
examine the difficulties inherent in some optimality criteria
which seek to abstract output from distribution.
The original optimality criterion is that of Pareto,
according to which a "move" (i.e. change in the allocation and
distribution of resources) is an improvement if at least one
person gains and no one loses. The central problem with this
rule is that it has nothing to say abuut the vast majority
of changes, ie. 1 e., those which involve some being made worse
off. At the same time it can judge optimal a move which (as ie
shall demonstrate) increases inequality in a society which will
universally be regarded aB unjust.
In order to come to terms with the essential emptiness of
6.
Pareto's rule, the so-called "compensation principle" and
modifications thereof were put forth. The originator of
this concept was Kaldor, who defined optimum moves as those
in which individuals who were made worse off could be com-
pensated by those who had been made better off, with the
latter still receiving a net benefit. The immediate difficulty
with this rule is what Baumol has termed its "crucial
characteristic, namely, that it does not require that persons
injured by some economic phenomenon must actually be
compensated in full by those who have gained from it".12
There have been attempts to render the compensation principle
more palatable by requiring actual compensations. Yet, as
Streeten has pointed out, not only is actual compensation
impractical on the level of' knowledge of individ.uals'
preferences, but more seriously, its "use would betray a
conservative bias, because the basis of compensation is the
status quo. A policy based on such a rule may involve
changes which would preclude other changes which would have
i13been more desirable''.1 Needless to say, economists have
considered the problem of compensation at a very abstract
level. However it is a crucial issue in cost-benefit analysis,
especially as regards urban renewal. A certain amount of
compensation is always given those who are displaced by an
urban renewal project. However, the cost-benefit analyst who
is concerned with distribution will (1) place a higher value
on benefits which accrue to lower income groups, (2) consider
as a cost the differences between the qctual compensation to
7.
losers (displacers) and the magnitude of their loss, and (3)
judge the opportunity costs of a project in terms of the benefits
foregone by not undertaking a. more desirable project, from the
standpoint of his schema of costs and benefits. These statements
will be discussed more fully in the final chapter.
There are differences between Pareto and Kaldor and Hicks1 4
regarding the criteria for optimum (welfare enchancing) policies,
programs, or outputs. But as economists in the classical or
neo-classical traditions they would agree with certain evaluations
with which the present writer would disagree. Tn order to bring
this point out, a diagram using the least ambiguous kinds of
utility possibility curves will be used (all parallel, non-
intersecting) in a hypothetical society which will-universally
be regarded as unjust.
Suppose we have a society composed of 11 individuals; 10
slaves and a master. The slaves' welfare will be denoted along
the X axis and the master's along the Y axis. The initial utility
possibility curve is given by AA. BB' represents a utility
possibility curve after the slaves have organized and use
their -unity to improve their income and decrease hours of
work. CC' represents a utility curve after (say) an improved
production technique is introduced, and the points along the
curve imply whether the slaves have organized as with Bf' or
not.
8.
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The initial situation is represented by point M, in which the
welfare positdon of the slaves is given by OX and that of the
master by MI. According to the three economists,.we are discussing,
any point along AA' is equally desirable. However, a move to B'
is by definition a welfare decreasing one since the possibility
for utility along BB' is less than along AA', even though the
actual welfare of the slaves is increased by a move from M on
AA' to P on BB'.
Again, according to the economists, a move from M on AA'
to Q on CC' is an optimal one since one person is made better
off (the master) and no one is made worse off (the welfare of
the slaves remains the same). This is the move we alluded to
earlier in which inequality in an unjust society is increased
and yet the change is judged an optimal one. On the other
hand, if the move from M on AA' to either S or R on CC'
(assuming the combined welfare of slaves and master is the same
at either S or R, e.g., 200 for master and 50 for slaves at
S and 150 for slaves and 100 for master at R), this change is
9.
equally ambiguous on some criteria and equally desirable on
others.
The moral of all this is that unless one explicitly passes
judgment on the optimality of the existing distribution of income
(one might add of political power as well) changes in the level
of total income have no normative significance. Arrow has put
this somewhat more forcefully: "There is no meaning to total
output independent of disttibution".15 Specifically, in an
economy with a price system, whether in fact a move or prpject
is efficient involves a value judgment. Scitovsky has recently
made a similar argument:
Indeed the main lesson to be learned from all
this, from my account of the criticisms and
shortcomings of consumers sovereignty and of the
benefits and advantages of alternate aims, is
that the economist can no longer regard his
standards as given to him from outside, but must
make a judgment of his own what standards to
accept within what limitations and with what
qualifications. 16.
10.
III. EXTERNALITIES
A highly important economic phenomenon from the point of
view of public investment (or intervention) and one whose policy
implications varies signficantly with the observer's appraisal of
the economic system (as to whether it is in equilibrium or not)
is that of externalities. This latter point is brought out by
Chenery:
In its earlier usage it~external economies]
pertains to costs and benefits of production not
adequately reflected in the price mechanism; in
growth theory it refers to the effect of one
investment on another. The former uses the
assugptions of competitive equl'ibium, lrhile
the latter acquires its significance from the
assumptions of dynamic disequilibrium. 17
It will be useful to discuss the basis and implications of this
statement. Scitovsky joints out in his suggestively titled
"Two Concepts of Eternal Economies" that given the assumptions
of general equilibrium theory, viz., perfect competition and
perfect divisibility of all resources& and products, any divergence
from optimality (in Pareto's sense) occurs only when "there is
an interdependence among the members of the economy that is
direct, in the sense that it does not operate through the market
mechnaism. In general equilibrium theory, then, direct interdependence
is the villain of the piece and the cause for conflict between
private profit and social benefit".1 8
An externality exists when there is both "interdependence
together with the lack of accompanying compensation", 9 leading
to a condition in which the marginal social net benefit is greater
or less than its marginal private return.20 With regard to production,
the output of the individual producer depends not only on "his
11.
input of productive resources but also on the activities
of other firms".21 Put symbolically , external economies
exist whenever the output (x1 ) of a firm depends not only on
the factors of production (11, c1 ,...) utilized by this firm but
also on the output (32) and factor utilization (12, c2 1' ) of
another firm or group of firms:
x I= F (1ll, c,...p2' 1 27'''
Finally, given the assumption of general equilibrium
theory, the only kinds of external economies which can arise
are due to direct (i.e. non-market) interdependencies among
producdrs or between producers and consumers and are termed
"technological externalites". Briefly, technological external-
ities are distinguished from pecuniary externalities in that the
latter (using the- same notation as above) are represented by
the following function:
PI= G (x1 , c,...; x2 ' 12, c2'''.)
where the profits of a firm depend not only on its own output
but also on the output and factor outputs of other firms.
The problems associated with pecuniary external economies
have appeared most often in the context of underdeveloped
countries, where the economic situation is often described
as one of "dynamic disequilibrium". What is wanted is some
criterion upon which to base investment decisions. For example,
Chenery has posed the following question:
12.
To what extent and under what circumstances do
coordinated investment decisions lead to more
efficient resource use than do individual decisions
based on existing market information? 23.
There seem to be three reasons why "coordinated investment
decisions" are often thought to be necessary to further economic
growth. The first relates to the fact that interdependencies
among the various elements of the economy may not - but should
be - exploited. Since with pecuniary externalities, the profits
of a firm B (and possibly its future investment) are dependent
upon the output of another firm, A, if for some reason A does
not exist or is operating on a very small scale, B will not be
able to expand, nor will those firms which use B's output as
inputs. In other words, the whole process of growth may be
stultified in the absence of coordination, i.e. investing in A.
As Dobb has.put it,
When the expansion of one industry could not
be undertaken at a profit, at leastuuttil an
initial stage was passed, and yet its existence
was essential to the growth of other industries,
and without it these others would be brought to a
standstill. 24.
then coordinated investment decisions are called for.
The second case in which pecuniary externalities may
lead to insufficient investment (and output) has been discussed
by Scitovsky. If investment in firm A does not lead to investment
in firm B, but merely decreases the cost of A's inputs to B and
consequently increases B's profits, then only "if the expansion
of the two industries were integrated would the profitability of
investment in each one of them be a reliable index of its social
desirability'..25 When pecuniary external economies are appropriated
13.
by firms then profits (in a market economy) are "a bad guide to
economic optimum, so far as investment and industrial expansion
is concerned".26 Scitovsky feels it is necessary to coordinate
those investment decisions "which have a delayed effect and - I
looking ahead to a future period - should be governed not by
what the present economic situation is but by what the future
economic situation is expected to be".2 7
The third argument for co-ordinated investment decisions
exists when a chief premise of equilibrium theory is not met,
that of perfect divisibility. Lerner has pointed out that an
indivisibility:
..may be found in the factor, in the product,
or in the method of production...factors are often
available only in large units like waterways, that
products are often produced in naturally large
units like ocean liners or skyscrapers and that
methods of production are also often of a minimum
size even if the factors and the products are fairly
dividable, like an assembly blant for autohobiles
or a continuous stripe-steel rolling mill. 28.
Interestingly enough, the seminal work in cost-benefit MA'll i
Dupuit was addressed specifically to the determination of
% criterion of the social desirability of investment in the
classic types of indivisibilities, viz., those of transport,
such as canals, roads, bridges, and railways.2 9 Dupuit took
as his example a bridge. If a toll was charged sufficient
to cover the capital costs of the bridge, this would involve
an important reduction both in its use and in the utility
derived from its use. On the other hand, since its use involved
14.
a zero marginal cost, utility'would be maximized if there were
no toll. As for calculating the social benefit of the bridge,
he used the concept of "consumer"s surplus", i.e., the difference
between the maximum amount consumers are willing to pay rather
than go without a specified amount of a good and what they
actually pay. The usual procedure for this calculation is to
estimate what the operator (of the bridge) could have appropriated
had price discrimination been practiced. Simply stated, the views
of both Dupuit and Lerner are that excess capacity and monopolistic
pricing decrease the social benefits which can be derived from an
indivisibility. AskLerner put it,
The uneasiness of accepting a permanent loss
is often due to identifyigg the irrelevent aspects
of perfect competition with the optimum use of
resources. 30.
To combine this with Scitovsky's observation that "profits
under free competition may be regarded as a rough index of
disequilibrium"31: social benefits are maximized when pecuniary
externalities and excess capacity ate minimized.
The major purpose of this discussion of externalities is
for the application of this concept to areas which are unalogous,
but not generally conceived of in this light. Rothenberg has
examined the externalities inherent in what he calls "jurisdictional
mobility", whereby residents of one political jurisdiction (suburbs)
can use the services of another political jurisdiction (cities)
without contributing to their upkeep, which in turn affects tax
rates, resource allocation, and locational decisions of firms. 3 2
15.
Taking a long view, Rothenberg suggests that urban renewal can
have the untoward effect of inducing city officials to regard
profitability as the answer to their problems, which may preclude
the necessary structural changes, i.e., coordination of inter-
dependent (from social and economic points of view) - yet
fractionated (politically) units.
We are now in a position to investigate the relevence of
externalities for cost-benefit analysis. As McKean suggests,
the rationale for government investment (in 1ervention) has been
based on the existence of externalities.33 Since payment cannot
be exacted for economies or diseconomies and yet their existence
has a positive or negative effect on social welfare, some
government action is called for in a capitalist economy.
Suppose now that traffic congestion and its consequences
(air pollution, noise, hindrance of pedestrian mobility, etc.-)
have become unbearable in a given city and the voters decide that
a radical measure is needed, say banning automobiles from the
center of the city in conjunction with provision of parking
facilities on the periphery of the city and an efficient and
palatable rapid transit system. What is the relation between
such a policy and an analogous one in an underdeveloped country,
say building a road to a hitherto.inaccesiible resource? Quite
clearly, both involve indivisibilities. On the one hand, either
autoimobiles are banned and measures are taken to insure mobility
or not. On the other, either the road is built or not. Similarly,
both actions are designed to cope with externalities. In-the case
16.
of the city, the immediate aim is the elimination of the dis-
economies associated with traffic congestion. Assuming that
intra-city mobility is enhanced, this in association with the
elimination of diseconomies increases the desirability of living
and working in the city.
In other words, there are significant benefits froin the
point of view of the present residents of the city in addition
to those consequent upon the elimination of a diseconomy. In the
case of the underdeveloped country, the consequence of building
the road involves not merely the benefit of the resource and
increase in per capita income, but also (in the presence of
coordinated decision making) the generation of new industries
for which the resource is a necessary input, and, thus, a further
rise in per capita income.
The major point of this comparisoniis that the elimination
of diseconomies and exploitation of potential economies are
analogous in a very important sense. In both cases, indivisibilities
may be prerequisites for bringing about a desired end and unless
this is realized the present admittedly undesirable situation may
become worse. On the one hand the city in question may become an
even less desirable environment in which to live and work and in the
case of the underdeveloped country, per capita income may decrease.
Traffic congestion is certainly not the only diseconomy
present in cities. Others which are equally important will be
discussed below. A chief thesis of this paper is that it is the
presence of diseconomies in cities which has chiefly rendered them
undesirable. Since urban renewal has not recognized this fact, the
17.
consequence of "projects" is to ignore or exacerbate existing
diseconomies, while futilely attempting to achieve those benefits
consequent upon eliminating the diseconomies altogether.
It is interesting to note that the concept of indivisibilities
has often been invoked in urban renewal. Its use has centered about
the "need" to level the whole of an area. In Kaskel v. Impellitteri
(1953) Judge Desmond stated:
the statute (and the Constitution), like other
similar laws, contemplates that clearing and
redevelopment will be of an entire area, not of
a separate parcel, and surely, such statutes
would not be very useful if limited to areas
where every single building is substandard. 34.
This view (i.e. that total elimination of existing structures
is necessary) has largely been discredited since 1953, though
it is still an implied premise in much of urban renewal. In
actuality the connotation of "indivisibilities" as used by
Judge Desmond merely expresses the conditions under which the
developer believes he will maximize his profits. This may have
nothing to do with the necessary conditions for increasing
social welfare or resolving the problems of central cities.
As a general rule, actions which decrease diseconom-ies
are preferable to those which are neutral and both are preferable
to programs which exacerbate existing diseconomies. A similar
rule can be made for decisions or actions which internalize
externalities. Finally it should be clear that cost-benefit
analysis must explicitly take into account the externalities
generated by a public project,.,since these will be the decisive
18.
eleme-nts io determining the vorth of a project.
19.
IV. SO CIAL TIME PREFORENCE
The literature of cost-benefit analysis is replete with
formulae for calculating the discounted present value of future
benefits for a given public undertaking. In a general way, all
observers agree that some discount must be attached to income
-occurring at future dates if for no other reason than to set some
limit upon any investment program. However, the discussion of
cost-benefit analysts does not generally come to terms with the
basic question, regarding the determination of the appropriate
discount rate. -There is generally some debate on a technician's
level: the government's borrowing rate is less appropriate than
the market rate of interest, or, since the market rate of interest
is not uniform, the relevent rate is the interest rate available
to one or another income class or firm. The question of the
appropriate discount rate is intimately connected with many of
the points which have already been raised, just as it is directly
related to the kinds of projects which are undertaken. It is
therefore quite important that the basic questions regarding its
use be discussed.
The divergence between the private discount rate and social
discount rate is not due solely to the facts that capitat markets
are not perfect and perfect competition does not prevail. Even
granted the assumptions of equilibrium theory there still remains
the possibility that atomistic savings and investment decisions will
result in a higher marginal rate of substitution of futwit for
present consumption than is desirable from the viewpoint of society
as a whole.
20.
In particular, it is possible to make all individuals better
off by undertaking more investment collectively than each finds
desirable to undertake privately. This point is brought out by
35
Marglin : given a general agreement that growth is not proceding
rapidly enough, it follows that the marginal social rate of
discount is lower than the market rate. As a consequence it is
necessary:
that theccommunity in its collective, political
capacity properly sees to it - directly or
indirectly - that investment opportunities with
future returns too low to justify private exploitation
without the intervention of the state are in fact
undertaken. 36.
One aspect of Marglin's statement is brought out in Sen's
notion of the "isolation paradox", according to which an
individual will be willing to sacrifice his own pleasure for
future generations, provided that others are also ready to do
the same.37 This concept, Sen likens to an external economy
which calls into question the meaningfulness of consumer's
sovereignty (granted its validity at all) since "the consumers
involved are not merely those of the present generation, but
also those yet to be born and those who are now too young to
express any preferences". The inability of large numbers of
individuals in this society to express "effective demand" ahd
the concomitant unequal distribution of income were questioned
at the beginning of this paper. As Schorr has written, "nearly
half the population has incomes at the margin or below the level
which would turn up in surveys as effective consumers demand". 3 9 The-
MOrket rate of interest,is a reflection of the timr, preference
of the more affluent groups in a society, since the concepts of
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savers' and consumers' voting are weighted according to the
income of those "voting". For more technical reasons
capital market imperfections) Feldstein asserts that it is
unlikely that there ever is a coincidence of private and
social ends of discount and he suggests that social time
preference "is a normative rate reflecting the government's
evaluation of the relative desirability of consumption at
different points in time".40 lie feels that since the market
cannot express the collectivd "demand for investment to benefit
the future and because we may prefer the weighls of some
political process to those of the market place", that the
41political process may be :invaked. Marglin on the other
hand believes that the marginal social rate of discount can
be objectively arrived at and that the government should
undertake investment till further investment becomes marginal
from the collective as well as individual points of view.4 2
There appears to be a more basic cause for divergences
between private and social rates of discount, at least when
employment or growth problems exist. According to Oobb:
.. from the social standpoint,-why should
profitability be the criterion, even if we
ignore external effects? Why should not the
sofial return on investment be regarded as
being the total resulting addition to national
output, without any such deduction of the values
of other factors?...from the community's point
of view the possession of additional equipment
that will enable one at future dates to afford
more employ'ment to labor.id, surely, part of
the benefit of investment. 43.
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The chief argument of this section can be brought out
through a et0arification of the above quote. Dobb is mistaken
in suggesting that "we" can ignore externalities. It is precisely
those external effects, increased employment and investment
opportunities as a result of certain investments, which are
ignored by the entrepreneur. From the point of view of society
the fact that such external effects follow from certain investments
is the most cogent argument for coordinated decisions. However, it
is highly probable that the gestation ( or "payoff") period for
such investments - from the viewpoint of the investment rather
than its effects - will be rather far off on the time horizon. It
is also possible that its effects will not be imediately forth-
coming, Nevertheless, the existence of the investment may be a
sine qua non for further growth. The implication follows: namely,
the social discount rate which is chosen is crucial. A high rate
will be biased against projects whose payoff is not immediate.
We shall now make an analogy similar to that in the previous
section on externalitiesi It is obvious to most observers that a
low social discount rate is necessary in underdeveloped countries.
What of a society in which thete exist substantial diseconomies?
An illuminating observation of Pigou's will bring out much
of what shall be said here and below on the subject:
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Perhaps, however, the crowning illustration of
this order of excess of private over social net
product is afforded by the work done by women
in factories...for there can be no doubt that
this work carries with it...grave injury to the
hiealth of their childten...In districts where
women's work of this kind prevails there is
presumably and this is the cause of the women's
work - great poverty. This poverty, which is
obviously injurious to children's health, is likely,
other things being equal, to be greater than
elsewhere in families where the mother declines
factory work, and it may be that the evil of the
extra poverty is greater than that of the factory
work...Therefore prohibition of such work should
be accompanied by relief to those families whom
the prohibition renders necessitous. 44.
The "vicious circle of poverty" of which one hears so much
in the USA of today, particularly as regards large numbers of
individuals in those cities where urban renewal is believed
necessary, is a "crowning illustration" of a perpetual diseconomy.
And the social costs of poverty (sometimes mistakenly applied to
slums) are enormous. In a sense, the lumenproletariat has
become an expensive luxury. An important argument in this paper
will be, that it has been a mistaken view to regard urban renewal
from the short-run profitability criterion implicit in the sorts
of projects which are undertaken. On the other hand the termination
of poverty may require a generation. Now given a high social rate
of discount, poverty and the social costs it generates, will
remain. For it will never be profitable to eliminate poverty,
tho-gh the poor become ever more costly to contain and maintain.
The kinds of programs or projects we have in mind are those
whichiimprove the income and self-sufficiency of the present
generation of the poor, with the recognition that such individuals
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will not themselves become wholly self-sufficient; the aim
being to insure than their children do not continue the cycle
of poverty. For example, the public provision of co-operative
apartments and stores, and employment foe the current generation
of poor will involve a subsidy element which exceeds the benefits
appropriated. On one level, a redistribution of this sort is not
efficient, though as Maasshas pointed out in a related area "the
community would probably be uilling to give up some efficiency
to see the living standard of the Indians improved by their own
labor rather than by the dole".45 On another level, if the aim
is to eliminate poverty, then our real concern is with providing
an enVironment for the children of the poor which will enable
them to become productive members of the labor force and society.
Since terminating poverty means expenditures in the present which
will yield benefits after a generation, then a high discount
rate will militate against such programs. In anticipation of what
will be analyzed in a later section, an observation of Grigsby's
is apt:
...in the entire arsenal of housing and urban
renewal programs, there is not today a single
tool that comes to grips with the basic dilersma -
low income. 46.
There are also physical diseconomies which entail large
initial outlays und may not pay-off for many years. We have
mentioned the elimination of auto congestion necessitatinp
the provision of peripheryl parking facilities and improved
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public transit systems. In our view, the physical problems of
cities are those associated with the kind of infra-structure
lacking in "post-industrial cities", e.g., diminishing the
pollution and..n6ise levels and providing for pedestrian mobility
and open space.
In conclulsion, the choice of a discount rate is a vitally
important consideration where the benefits from a public action
do not accrue in the short-run, and this will be the case for
those investments which seek to promote economic development or
eliminate entrenched diseconomies.
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V. SOCIAL OPPORTUNITY CO:TS
As a preface to our discussion of opportunity costs,
a quote from Lerner will be useful:
the ina4equacy of investment is mainly due to
inadequacy of consumption. The inadequacy of
consumption follows from the extremely unequal
distribution of income which prevents the poor
from consuming while the rich naturally save a
largre part of their income. 47.
In evaluating opportunity costs it is surely necessary for one
to be aware of the consequences of Lerner's observation. The
immense expenditures in the USA to stimulate demand must be
looked at as an alternative to equalizing the distribution of
income. By stimulating demand we mean, expenditures in the
private sector on the "sales effort", i.e. advertisin- and
policies of built-in obsolescence. In the public sector, the
massive expenditures on defense and space fall into the same
category.
In a perfectly egalitarian society, one might agree with
Feldstein that a project's social opportunity costs is the present
values of what society gives up in order to obtain the benefits of
a particular project and that the social oplortunity cost of
transferred funds is indicated by the marginal rate of productivity
of private investment.48 However, the USA is hardly an egalitarian
society. As Keyserling has pointed out:
More than 34 million Ame-ricans still live in poverty,
with incomes at least 50 per cent below those
required for a "minimum but adequate" budget in the
American perspective and more than 20 million of
these people are at least 33 1/3 per cent below the
income which they must reach to lift them out of
poverty. 49.
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As has been mentioned already, efficiency and hence
market prices and profitability are relative to a given
distribution of income. Consequently, the notion of oppor-
tuhity costs implies a value judgment Ls to whether a given
income distribution is equitable. It has analytic signif-
icance only among individuals who hold the same value '-
premises. It is probably the case that it is more "profitable"
to invest a dollar in advertising or missiles than in a park
or in the subsidized sale of cameras to slum children. However,
no policy implications are entailed by the greater profitability
of the former with respect to the latter.
Leaving aside the question of income distribution for
a moment, opportunity costs are suspect on other grounds as
well, Streeten points out that "wants and desires are not
ultimate, independent, autonomous data, but the product of
social relations..A different collection of goods, produced
in a different manner, would result in a different set of
wants".50 Unfortunately, economists do largely accept market
prices as "autonomous data". Galbraith is of course the chief
respectable exception, and he has offer-edc the opinion that:
privately produced goods and services, even of
the most frivolous sort, enjoy a moral sanction
not accorded to any public services except defense.51.
If one agrees with Galbraith, one is forced to make qualitative
judgments between the social value of heterogeneous goods and
services. For to accept that Galbraith calls the 2meretricious-
ness associated with the shaping of popular taste to economic
need" as a datum is a political choice - non-partisan to be sure.
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Let us now look at opportunity costs from a still different
viewpoint. Suppose that a public project ensues in a society
where there exists unutilized resources and moreover that in
addition to producing certain benefits the project also mobilizes
some of the slack resources. Given this situation the economy in
question is not making full use of its available resources.
This problem has been tackled by growth economists, especially
where underdevelopment coexists with widespread unemployment.
Marglin has focused on iqgputing a "shadow price" to resources
which in the context of an underdeveloped country have no alter-
nate use; unskilled labor in particular.52 Clearly the opportunity
cost of slack resources is fromv the societal standpoint much
below the price th-ey command on being utilized. Marglin points
out that the shadow-wage rate approaches zero.
While the reader might agree with our earlier remarks on
opportunity costs, he might argue that although shadow prices
or wages are applicable in the context of underdeveloped
countries they are not so in the USA. However, as soon as one
drops the unwarranted assumption of "full employment" in the USA
the relevence of shadow prices becomes evident. As Arrow puts it:
During a period of unemployment of labor or
capital, the market price of an input will
exceed its true social cost...Even in times
of generally high employment there may be local
area of unemployment; the same rules should hold
for projects in such an area. 53.
It is well known that a 3.7% unemployment rate for the country
as a whole masks the fact that unemployment for minority groups
(and to 4 lesser extent for the ages 18-25) is consistently between
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10-15%. With respect to policies for revivifying cities -
where a large proportion of these groups with high unemployment
rates reside - the kinds of projects undertaken might be quite
different were unemployment considered in the calculation of
social opportunity costs. One might add that the frequent
criticism of the War on Poverty's retraining of individuals
for jobs which do not exis t would have considerably less
persuasiveness if jobs were provided. Needless to say, from
the perspective of eliminating diseconomies associated with
poverty, the provision of well-paying jobs to members of the
urban lumpenproletariat is a necessary condition.
Feldstein offers another conception of social opportunity
costs; one which has greater anaoJytic validity than the
general notion of ",ie discountJ rate of the consumption stream
that would have occurred had the project not been undertaken".
Both he and McKean feel that without capital rationing the
cost of the project to society is the value of the transferred
funds in the private sector.54 However, with capital rationing,
the social opportunity cost of a projectiis the social benefit
which would have accrued had another project been undertaken.
Since we dispute the validity of this general notion of
opportunity costs, it should be irrelevent from our point of
view whether or not a project is -ubject to capital rationing.
Given our value framework, the cost of a project A for
evaluative purposes should always be calculated in terms of
the benefits forerone in not undertakin" project B. The
assumption is that any project is ostensibly underttLken to
satisfy social or merit wants and that there are signficant
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social and merit wants that have not yet been - and need to be -
satisfied. This assumption certainly does not hold for (even)
the putative goals of all public investments - e.,g. war and
space - but in the context of resolving urban problems - the
implied aim of urban renewal - it is safe to say that important
social and merit wants are at issue. The role of the urban
renewal cost-benefit analyst is to formulate a program best
able to achieve - what he considers to be - thr, long-run goals
implied in the fact that a renewal of urban areas (disregarding
its actual form) has actually been thought necessary and to
develop a schema for the various categories of costs and benefits
along with an adjustment factor for costs and benefits to different
income groups. The benefits which would have been forthcoming
had such a project been undertaken measure the social opportunity
costs of the projects which have actually been undertaken.
The ideal program of the analyst serves as a standard upon
which present programs can be judged.
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iil. MARIT AND SOCIAL WANTS
A brief delineation of Musgrave's "muttiple theory of
the public household" will serve as a fruitful reference
concept in our discussion of social and merit wants as well
aw for future arguments on the nature of urban renewal. 55In
Musgrave's theory, the Fiscal Department is responsible for
achieving these major objectives:
1. the diversioh of resources to satisfy public wants
2. the establishment of the desired or "proper" state of
distribution
3. the securing of price-level stibility and full employment
Musgrave posits teste Branches of the Fiscal Department, eqch
determining the policies and programs necessary to achieve
the particular objective in its domain. The Allocation Branch
is responsible for 1; the Distribution Branch for 2; and
the Stabilization-Branch for 3; Musgrave's Fiscal Department
operates at the national level. At the local or metropolitan
levels, Chinitz and Tiebout have argued that a Stabilization
Branch is not tenable.56 They also maintain that redistribution
will generally take the form of income - in'kind transfers
(e.g. low-income housin) - i.e. will be incorporated in the
Local Allocation Branch. While it is true that the provision
of public goods often has distributional motivations or
implications, transfer payments via public welfare make up
a sizable part of the local budget in most cities and such
transfers are clearly handled by some agency comparable to
Musgrave's Distribution Branch.
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It is the Allocation Branch and its provision of goods
to satisfy social and merit wants which is our interest in this
section. As for social or public goods, the major justification
for their existence in a capitalist economy is presented by
Baumol in the following way:
The reason a government must provide certain
types of goods is that the private sector cannot
be ddpended upon to offer them in appropriate
amounts and the central explanation which is
offerred for this deficiency in recent writing
relies heavily on the theory of externalities. 57.
In other words, social goods cannot be supplied througph the
mechanism of the market because their enjoyment cannot be made
subject to price payment. Uusgrave gives two conditions under
which a good is properly of this nature, both implied in the
notion of benefits which are yielded indiscriminately. The two
conditions are:
1. there is necessarily joint consumption, i.e. the same
amount must be consumed by all, and
2. theexclusion principle is inapplicable, i.e., the consumption
of the good does not reduce its utility to any other individual
and at the same time, the good is a "free" good once it is
provided.58 Since goods and services which satisfy social
wants can be had by all without payment once they are provided,
it is in the interest of individuals (so the argument goes) to
understaje the amount they are willing to pay (through taxation),
i.e., the benefits which they receive from the good or services.
The basic rule which Musgrave advances concerning the allocation
of social goods is that their allocation should be "in response
to the effective demand of consumers, deterained by individual
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preferences and the prevailing state of distribution".59
Given the weighting procedure implied in this rule one would
suspect that not all goods nominitlly considered social are so
in fact (e.g. space) and conversely, a deficiency in the supply
of certuin other social goods (trenchantly illustrated by
the sale of public parks to private industries, e.g. lumber
interests).
According to Musgrave, merit wants:
are met by services subject to the exclusion
piinciple and are satisfied by the market
within the limits of effective demand. 60.
That is, merit goods have perfect substitutes on the
private market, and an individual is excluded froi consuming
them if he does not demonstrate effective demand, i.e., the
ability to pay for them. Merit wants become public wants
if they are considered so meritorious that their satisfaction
is provided for through the public budget, over and above what
is provided for through the market and paid for by private
buyers.61 Musgrave expresses the general view that the
satisfaction of merit wants necessarily involves an
"intedference with consumers' preference". We have already
disputed the validity of the notion of consumer's preference
or sovereignty. To take our disputation one step further,
while it is certainly the case that. the output and pricing
policies of oligopolies and monopolies as well as the
omnipresence of advertising undeniably interfere with
consumer's sovereignty, it can be argued that merit wants
are satisfied through the political process in which there
is a closer approximation of "one man, one vote" than in
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the market place. Moreover, the preference which an
individual voices qua consumer are certainly less inclusive
than those which he voices qua citizen. Therefore, since
the satisfaction of merit wants is requested by individuals
in their status as sovereign citizens there is no inter-
ference with their pceferences.
The distinction between merit wants, social wants, and
redistribution is not nearly so clear as -might rima facie
appear. Two contradicting statements may bring this point out:
Many so-called merit wants are in fact instances
of a group redistribution objective and should
be considered as such. 32.
Situations arise that seem to involve merit wants
but on closer inspection involve social wants. 63.
Once the very real problem of interest conflicts among
societal groups is brought out (as will be in the next section),
the frequent equivalence of merit wants with social wants and/or
the redistribution objective is not surprisinr. For example
where significant inequalities exist, "law and order" may be
considered a merit want of the dominant group and a condition
for its fulfillment may be the satisfaction of merit wants
and/or a degree of redistribution to the dominated groups.
Engels has thoughtfully provided an appropriate example:
Modern natural science has proved that the
so-called "poor districts" in which the workers
are crowded together, are the breedin- places of
all the epidemics which from time to time afflict
our towns...llere the germs hardly ever die out
completely, and as soon as circumstances permit
they develop into epidemics and then spread beyond
their breeding places into the more airy and healthy
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ports of the town inhabited by the capitalists..
As soon as this fact has been scientifically
established the philanthropic bourgeois become
inflamed with a noble spirit of competitior in
solicitude for the health of their workers. 64.
Musgrave, too, lists "free health measures" as one of those
instances in which merit and social wants are inextricably
bound up together.65 On the other hand, public health measures,
e.g. free out-patient clinics or Medicare, can be considered
an instance of the "group redistribution objective". In the
absence of a theory of group interests, these three conc pts
are somewhat vacuous. Even with an adequate descriptived theory
of interest conflicts a good or service which is provided
publicly must be evaluated in a specific manneri.Irl order to
determine - from the observer's perspective - which objectives
(and whose) it is serving.
It can safely be stated that the higher the proportion of
low-income individuals in a local political unit in the SA, the
more that must be expended for merit wants and redistribution.
So long as merit wants, social wants, and redistribution are
provided for at the national level, no shift of population at
lower political levels is occasioned. However, given a concen-
tration of low-income individuals in a particular city one
expects higher taxes than in a homogfeneous middle-class
community. As Musgrave has pointed out, at the local level
individuals can move from "less to more congenial fiscal
communities".66 In spite of Musgravd's felicitous phrasing the
financial plight of centraLl cities has been exacerbated largely
because middle-and-upper income individuals have the ability and
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motivation to flee to the suburbs. And from the point of view
of maximizing their welfare, if only through reducing the taxes
they must pay, this is an eminently rational move. So long as
the burden of maintaining the poor remains largely a local one,
such movements are to be expected to continue. Even given a
metropolitan taxing authority, indivudals could still choose
'tmore congenial fiscal" metropolitan areas.
It was mentioned earlier that a public good or service
can meet one of several objectives. Rothenberg has suggested
that the urban renewal program "operates as an indirect mechanism
w 67for transmitting intergoverpniental grants". From the perspective
of the entire society, urban renewal is a program of the
Redistribution Branch since funds are transferred to certain
geographical areas (cities) for rather general ends, i.e.,
renewing cities. However, the kind of urban renwal project
which is actually~ndertaken determines whether a merit or
social want (or neither) is being satisfied. Therefore the
question is an empirical one and each project must be ex.,mined
in order for this determination to be made. The first question
to be asked is whether a project satisfies collective, i.e.,
social wants. As far as the actual operation of urban renewal
is concerned, it appears that most projects actually satisfy
merit wants, i.e., cater to pwrticular groups. 'hileiit is
often implicitly assumed that (say) increasing the tax base
is a social want at the local level, since this strategy may
in fact militate against long-run structural solutions and since
certain groups are often directly hurt by projects ostei sibly
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aimed at increasing the tax base such projects and their
justification must be examined in terms of actual and expected
beneficiaries.
The class of projects which satisfy social wants strictly
or both social and merit_ wonts are those which aim at the
elimination of diseconomies. The fact that important diseconomies
exist within sities is the chief reason why some kind of urban
renewal is called for. However, it unfortunately does not
follow that urban renewal in practice seeks to come to termis
with these diseconomies. With regard to eliminating one importanLt
diseconomy, viz. poverty, Kenneth Boulding offers the following
observatioi; (apropos of the California Water Plan):
It would be well to be quite sure
Just who are the deserving poor
Or else some state-supported ditch
May serve the undeserving Rich. 68.
State-supported urban renwal projects oftimes manage
to satisfy the dubious merit wants of more affluont members
of the metrppolitan area and, in addition - as we shall see -
inflict real costs on the more vulnerable, less affluent, members
of the city. Since a large part of urban renewal financing
(from 2/3 to 3/4) is paid for at the national level, urban
renewal need not entail s- ubstantial taxing effects on those
members of the city or metropolitan.area who do not directly
benefit. Therefore Tiebout's and Chinitz' intepretalion of
merit wants at the local level is not necessarily an accurate one:
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As we interpret m-erit goods, not only does
the user of a subsddized merit good, by
definition, pay less than the full price, but
all citizens of the coimmunity are taxed to pay
the subsidy regardless of their preference
function. This is a case where the majority simply
imposes its will or all. 69.
The uniqueness of urban renewal inheres in the fact that the
provision of projects which satisfy merit wants will generally
cost the citizens of the community very little in terms of
actual financing. A substantial "tax burden" is borne by some
groups in a most unusual form, viz., through forced relocation
and decreases in the stock of low-rent housing. This is to say,
that some groups directly bear major burden in the subsidization
of others' "merit wants". It is certainly feasible that urban
renewal could meet the interpretation of Chinitz and Tiebout;
but it has not in practice. In a sense, then, urban renewal
agencies have been able to carry out their programs "on the
cheap", because there are substantial numbers of poor in citie's
who can be manipulated without compensation. From the point of
view of society and hence of the cost-benefit analyst, such forms
of compulsion and exploitation are social costs, and should be
calculated as such.
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VII. INTEREST CONFLICTS
McKean has written that:
projects (as they will actually be carried out)
will provide gratuitous or deliberate subsidies -
subsidies that do not always represent equal
treatment of people in equal circumstances. 70.
McKean leaves thistparticular problem unresolved - i.e., the
problem of "who gets what, when, how?" Just as the social
technicians of the -Great Society have a gentlemen's agreement
that certain subjects are taboo (chiefly, conflicts occasioned
by the unequal distribution of wealth and power), so too,
the prevailing ideology circumscribes those aspects of the
status quo which are to be taken as ;ivens. Thirty years ago,
one of these "givens" was unemployment, which was lifted "out
of the sphere of human policy and made to appear as a product
of the natural order of things". 71 Needless to say, the dominant
groups of any society delimit what may and may not be
questioned by those analysts who wish to appear respectable,
in the mainstream, and influential. Mannheim has set forth the
reason why "restraint" is needed:
By calling everything utopian that goes
beyond the present existing order, one sets
at rest the anxiety that might arise from the
relative utopias that are realizable in another
order. 72.
An ex ante cost-benefit analysis, if it is to have any
value at all, must make some attempt to predict the ,irobable
gains and losses to different groups as a result of u particular
project. This is probably what Tiebout and Chinitz had in mind
when they wrote:
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It is easy to assume that transport
investments are good for everybody concerned,
at least the c.,mmunities along the right of way
and at the terminals. But...itiis by no means
obvious that a cost-benefit calculation would
net out the same way for all communities. 73.
They go on to point out that, with regard to metropolitan-wide
planning, there will certainly be disparities of costs and
benefits between comnunities and "cooperation is not likely
to be fostered by the evasion of these issues". 7 In a way, their
view is a useful antidote to the usual liberal belief that
"men of good will" cai forget their actual interests, and
opt for the "rational" approach as advocated by the initiator-
mediator. At the same time, Tiebout and Chinitz do not actually
spell out the real issues at stake, which in the final analysis
relate to the fact that the city-suburb dichotomy is chiefly
an economic and racial one. The animistic view of sociolog,
political science, and economics in the USA, i.e., the ascribing
of independdnt interests to the political process and geo-
graphical areas obscures more than it illuminates. As Mannheirm
has so perceptively indicted:
The organizational anomaly of bourgeois society
appears also in its social theory. The bourgeois
attempt at a thoroughgoin- rztionalization of
the world is forced nevertheless to halt when it
reaches certain phenomena. By sanctioninn, free
competition and the class strufvgle, it even
creates a new irrational sphere. 75.
Implied in mych of what we have said thus far is the belief that
given inequality, terms like efficiency, optimality, general
welfare and social wants are somewhat less than entirely meaningful,
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and rather the opposite approach of wertfrei. The argument
that the most efficient project should be undertaken given
the distribution of income and then lump-sum transfers should
be made to losers, ignores the fact that (1) such transfers are
not in fact made and (2) we may be concerned with the form a
subsidy or transfer takes, e.g. preferring an above market
wage to a wlfare payment. In concluding this chapter, a quote
from Myrdal is appropriate:
The crux of the matter is, of course, that
when the old liberal postulate of a harmony
of interests is renounced, politill conclusiohs -
and ultimately theoretical research - must be
founded on explicit value premises which must
be concrete and take into account the actual
conflicts of interests between different
social groups. 70.
This is not to say that the cost-benefit analyst becomves al
ideologist for one or another interest group. It is to say
that the analyst must make a judgment as to the equity of
the existing' distribution of income and ownership of capital
and as to the presence or absence of equality of opportunity.
Since public actions do not benefit all groups equally, he
cannot be indifferent to who benefits and who loses as a result
of a public action.
41.
CHAPTER TWO
THE GOALS, CONSEQUE2CES - AND SOME
RATIONALES - OF URBAN RENEWAL
42.
1. LAISSFM-FAIRtE URBAN TENE WAL
It has been held that urban renewal "is concerned with
the allocation of land resources to competing uses, and not so
much with the existence or non-existence of public goods and
services". For what it leaves unsaid as well as for the definition
it offers, this view of urban renewal is not very helpful.
To say that urban renewal is predominantly "concerned
with land allocation" obviously tells one very little either
about urban renewal itself or the difference between urban
renewal and other social phenomena which on a very formal
plane have also been involved with land allocation. For example,
the Enclosure Acts in Great Britain between 1760-1820 were
very much concerned with the allocation of land. However,
the reasons for the enclosure movement cannot be understood
apart from the Industrial Revolution; similarly, urban renewal
is a consequence of the problems of "post-industrial" America.
Formal definitions of either -of these public policies necessarily
obscure their social and economic roots.
At another level, it isnnot very meaningful to abstract
the formal consideration of "conpetinfr land uses" from the ends
and beneficiaries of changes in land use. Here analogies between
the enclosure movement and urban renewal are more to the point.
Tie enclosure movement benefited the large landlords and im-
poverished the peasants. The farmers who were forced to leave
the land "were compensated with a sum of money which was not
enough to enable him to set up as a capitalist farmer or pay
for the hedging of the plot allotted to him". With necessary
changes in character and historical milieu, there are interesting
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parallels between the consequences of the enclosure movement
and those of urban renewal.
The fundamental issues which divide individuals over urban
renewal are not new, sincechanges in the status quo always
bring benefits to some and inflict losses on others. For this
reason, onemay gain only a superficial view of the deeper
problems in urban renewal if he views it in a too particular-
istic fashion, that is, as a specific response to the urban
problems of mid-twentieth century America. In a sense, there
always remain certain unresolved societal problems (who does
and doesn't get what, when, how?) but the form in which they
emerge is particular to a given social and historical context.
It is in this more profound sense that the enclosure movement
parallels urban renewal.
The American problems of racism and of disciepancies in
income - and conflicts - between cities and suburbs were certainly
not evidenced in nineteenth century France. Yet Engels'
observation of Parisian urban renewal is markedly contemporary,
and might be applied in toto to much of urban renewal in the
USA of today:
In reality the bourgeoisie has only one method
of settling the housing question after its
fashion - that is to say, of settling it in such
a way that the solution continually poses the
question anew. This method is called "Haussmann". 3.
By "Haussmann" I mean the practice. which has now
become general, of making breaches in the working-
class quarters of our big cities, particularly in.
those which are centrally situated...No matter
how different the reasons may be, the result is
everywhere the same: the most scand&loins alleys
and lanes disappear to the accompaniment of lavish
self-glorification by the bourgeoisie on account
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of this tremendous success, but - they appear
again somewhere else, and often in the immediate
neighborhood. 4.
Almost one hundred years later, similar observations are being
made a ropos of American urban renewal, though with a degree
of ingenuousness:
We.hnow that soon the dilapidated houses and
run-down shops will be replaced by impressive
new apartments and office buildings. But
there is much we do not know. What happened to
the families who were evicted? 5.
Glazer has given an interesting account of the origins
and developments of urban renewal in the USA. He points out
that urban renewal was created by a curious alliance "of
those seeking reform and those seeking profits".6 The former
were concerned with the lack of amenities and planning, and
they wished to improve the lot of the poor (mainly through
public housing). The commerdial and financial interests on
the other hand sought to maintain the level of business and
property values in downtown areas, "Jeopardized somewhat by
an increasingly poor (and incidentally, non-white) central-city
populace". According to Glazer, both the reformers and the
dominant interest.s "wanted to stem the rapid flow of the
more propperous citizens to the suburbs". This shared desire
to hold onto or bring back the middle class is both the
unifying factor and the justification for the kinds of projects
which are undertaken. It does not appear that either Glazer or
the feformers are aware, that given this basic instrumental
goal (i.e., bringing back or keeping middle and upper income
families) urban renewal in its present form is a lorical
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consequence. Glazer contends that the city politicians also
shate this premise, seeing it as a sine qua non for revivifying
their cities, in terms of increasing the tax base. Needless to
say, the alliance is no longer intact. The reformers are largely
critical of urban renewal and their :giftwhile bed-fellows.
Yet, the reformers still generally accept the premises of urban
renewal, and their criticisms are of its untoward consequences.
The question of whether urban renewal gives "a hand to those who
are most deprived" is no longer seriously asked. Its place is
taken by "If not, does it in any way hurt them?!'8 Schovr and
other reformers recognize that the instrumental goals of urban
renewal are inconsistent with their own aims of helping the poor
and improving the level of amenities in cities. Much writing by
the reformers turns on demonstrating how physical and social
diseconomies have been exacerbated as a result of renewal.
We have spoken of "bring back the middle class" as the goal
of urban renewal. Actually, it is the chief instrumental goal about
which thereiis a consensus - according to Glazer - among those
interested in renewal. The middle class and its consumption
function is surely not an end-in-itself. But a good sized middle
class population is considered a necessary condition for bringing
about other goals which are not themselves instrumental. About
these other goals, i.e., those which are dependent on solid
sales and a solid tax base, there is a certain amount of vague-
ness. And, indeed, those aspects of urban life which are held in
high esteem by (say) Muford and the denizens of European cities
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(open space, pedestrian ways, irchitectural standards, and
non-fetid waterways) may in the American context be merblf-
instrumental. The idea that the city itself,and not
just the people within it, exists to be exploited seems to be a
uniquely American one; both at the le#el of idea and in its
actual reification; This observation is reinforced by Veblen:
'The-rlocation- of any.giien*tow..:hasocoifuno*ly been
determined by collusion between "interested parties"
with a view to speculation in real estate, and
it continues through its life-history (hitherto)
to be managed as a real estate"proposition.'" Its
municipal affairs, its civic pride, its community
interest,.c6nVerge upon its real estate values,
which are invariably of a speculative character,
and hi.ch all its loyal citizens are intent on
"booming" and "boosting. "9
Veblen adds, it is "highly significant" that those residents
who own no realu-eatiteanor hope to-nevertheless perceive their
interdsts to ke'identical with the rentiers and speculators,
without realizing it is they (the renters) who pay for the
publicity and enhanced rentals.10 It is still the case that the
dominant interests in American cities seek enhanced property
values, rents, and sales. Urban renewal is a means toward their
ends. The potential losers from urban renewal still possibly see
the interests of the dominant groups to be eiuivalent to their
own, i.e., urban renewal is viewed in general as a good thing.
However, there is -no doubt that part{icular projects, whose
consequences are directly apparent, are not applauded by those
most likely to lose. The general belief that urban renewal's
role is to make the city more desirable for middle and upper
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classes is now accepted by almost all. The notion that such a
goal is indeed a public one to be undertaken with public funds
and by public or quaii-public agencies suffered its last and
final legal setback in the case of Schneider v. Parker (1953).
In that case the court ruled that the redevelopment authority
of Washington D.C. had acted ultra vifes since no public purpose
was evidenced iA the proposed renewal project. As Judge Prettyman
put it:
No acute housing shortage is to be met. In fact
the plan provides for no more residents than
presently occupy the area. No pressing economic
condition, apart from the slums, is tought to be
dealt with by this plan. No purpose of housing
for the needly - low-rent housing - is the
motivation. 11.
In the following year this ruling was over-turned in
Berman v. Parker 12, and renewal agencies were given wide latitude
to determine the public interest. This "interest" more often
than nst has been equated with the interests of the banks,
downtown merchants, and large developers and rentiera.
Both slum-elimination with redevelopment and rehabilitation
(with enhanced rentals) displace those who do not have sufficient
means to move from substandard Iousing of their own accord.
Therefore, the necessary cause of slums, viz.poverty, is in
no way diminished. The implied assupption is that nothing can
be done about poverty, at least in the short-run. The paramount
objective of renewal as we have mentioned is to greatly increase
the number of middle-and-upper income families in the city,
whereby prpperty values, the tax base, and sales will be
increased paripassu. A related objective is to bring "clean"
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or "light" (in practice, capital intensive and specialized,
or white-collar) industries into the city, since these provide
jobs for middle income and collegd trained individuals (both
instrumentally desired). In qddition, such industries raise
the tax base without directly causing diseconoinies (smoke, noise).
The continued existence of low-income areas performs a
necessary function in the renewal process. Since low-income
individuals are liabilities from the points of view of large
merchants and tax revenue, the areas in which the poor are
concentrated - a fortiori if close to the downtown - are the
natural locations for renewal projects. At the same time, the
existence of other slums and low-income areas permits re-
development to ensue with only minimal provision of compensation
to - or disruption by - those displaced. In short, standing
slums or low-income districts are ready-made receiving areas
for those displaced. One could suppose that all penurious or
marginal (economic-wise) individuals have been concentrated in
one last area, i4.,e,, the whole rest of the city has been taken
over by and for middle income and above individuals. It is at
this final stage, that the poor will be provided with decent
housing and employment. However, that is not n.ecessary, for
when all receiving areas are themselves surfeited the renewal
process can simply be terminated.
What we have outlined above is a "laisser-ftire" view
of urban renewal; laisser-faire in the sense that the pattern
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of benefits and costs to classes of individuals are
consistent and predictable and the costs are invariably
borne by those least able to fend for themselves; individuals
whose welfare is consequently diminished. Given this laisser-
faire form of renewal, we will develop a model showing the
meaning of "success'' and of expected changes in benefits and
losses occasioned by whether or not "success" is forthcoming.
First it will be useful to consider Baumiol's model of the
problems of cities. Whether or not it actually corresponds
to reality, Baumol's model puts into symbols a prevalent
view, the acceptance of which demands some kind of urban
renewal.
Baumol calls his model "the theory of cumulative
determination".13 Basically, the model asserts that blight
and per capita income are directly'relatedAn a dyn'amic sense,
and out-migration is a consequence of increases in the former
or decreases in the latter. The two basic equations Baumol
puts forth are:
t = g (Y dg/dyCO
which asserts that the index of blight and deterioration
at time t (B) is a decreasing function of per-capita income
at that date (Y) and:;
Y t+1I = G (B3 ) dG/dB C<0
which asserts that per capita income in period t+l (Yt+1)
is a decreasing function of level of blight in the previous
period..
Naturally Y t+ is an increasing function of Y and the
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obverse is the important point, viz., that a decrease in per
capita income in one period decreases per capita income in the
next period which in turn increases blight. The implications of
Baumol's model are that once an exodus from the city begun, it
may only end at a point when per capita income in the city is
at a very low level and only V the non-mobile and
impoverished remain. While Baumol asserts that-rddical measures
are necessary to cope with the problems of cities, (and
recommends in a related area the banning of privately owned
pausenger cars from downtown streets to cope with the traffic
problem) 1, the policy implication of his model need not be
radical. For in fact there are only two ways to deal with the
vicious circle of decreases in income begetting further decreases,
and both of these methods entail funds from a higher govetn-
mental level. Either the "decision-maiers" can implement
policies designed to lure back or hold onto middle and upper
income.families, or the income of below middle income families,
can be raised. Since the former approach has been the one taken,
we shall assume it in our Oodel of laisser-faire urban renewal.
We have the following assumptions: urban renewal is given,
and all changeu are therefore with respect to time. There are
two income classes, middle (and above) and low (and below). The
goal of urban renewal is to increase property values qnd average
sales per resident, implying as the instrumental goal, an in-
crease in the number of middle - and above - income families in
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the city. TheSe goals are not necessarily the dewiderata
of all groups in the city - as we hope to show. We bhall use
the following symbols:
h total number of dwelling units
h low rent units
h middle rent (and above) units
f total families
f number of low income families
f2 number of middle income (and above) families
S level of sales, in terms of average sales per resident
r level of median rent for all units
r level of median rent for low rent units
r2  level of median rent for middle rent (and above) units
v -vacancy rate for all units
v vacancy rate for low rent units
v2 vacancy rate for middle (and above) rent units
In order for middle-income families to be attracted to a
project, desirable housing must be provided. The location of
the project is subject to two constraints: greatest accessibility
to the downtown 4nd least acquisition cost of land plus improve-
ments. The choice of location thereforo falls on a slum area
proximate to the downtown. One of the chief characteristics
of urban slums or blighted areas is tieir high density, both
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in terms of individuals per dwelling unit &and dwelling units
per acre. The projects which replace slums will have fewer
dwelling units per acre than did the slum. A high density on
a portion of the renewal site will be offset by open space and
parking lots, so that total density will be less than pre-
renewal. In other words, the number of dwelling units in the
city decreases as a result of renewal, although the number of
middle-and-above rent units increases; we hafe:
h = f (t) 1.0
that is, changes in number of dwelling units is a function of
time, given urban renewal and:
dh <1 !L '9 dh 2 >01.dh(O, dlhI d t2 )11dt dt dt
since
dh > dh 1.2
Given the decrease in low-rent units, it seems fair to assume
that low income individuals will not migrate to the city. On
the other hand, rents in the city will still be lesE expensive
than those in the suburbs, so one does not expect an out mi-
gration of low-income families. In sum, given urban renewal,
the number of low-income families in the city will remain
stable over time, i.e., more or less constant:
df = 2.0
ut
If in fact migrations of low-income individuals to the city
continued in spite of urban renewal, i.e.,
df1> 0
di
our arguments regarding the welfare effects of urban renewal
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would be enhanced.
Given 1.2 and 2.0, the goals of increased property values
and sales by downtown merchants are dependent upon changes
in the number of middle-and-above income families who reside
in the city. We examine the realization (or not) of these goals
in light of the three possible outcomes of urban rnewal vis-&-vis
changes in the middle-income component of the city, which can
(a) increase, (b) remain constant, or (c) decrease; again,
given urban renewal.
Changes in the level of median rents (which we use as a
proxy for changes in property values) are dependent upon either
f2,hl, or h2. In particular:
r = G (f2, hl, h2 ) 3.0
That is, the level of median rents is dependent upon changes
in all three of the non-constant determined variables:
r = gi (hl) 3.1
Since
df' 0 (2.0)
dt
and
r2 = g2 (h2 1 f2) 3.2
Alternatively to §.0, r might be considered a function of
r and r2, i.e.:
r =.G (rl, r2)
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By 2.0, changes in the level of sales is dependent
only on f2. (Even were df > G, any increase in average sales
dt
per individual would still be a function of f2 alone):
. = k(f 2 ) 3.4
Vacancy rates are dependent upon changes in the number of dwelling
units and number of families (bidding for these units):
y = G(f2, hi, h2) 3.5
We now illustrate the three possible outcomes, taking
first the case where the number of middle-and above- income
families increases:
df2> 0 hence df > 0 4A.0
dt dt
dr) 0 (by 1.1, 2.0) 4A.1
dt
dr = j!2 dh2 + r df2 4A.2
dt 31 2 dt Df2 dt
_r2 d_t2?, 6 4A.3
Sh2 dt
i.e., the increase in h2 tends to lower r2; on the other hand,
ar dff2 0 4A.4
3f 2 dt
cr2 dh relates to supply and _r df to demand.
) h 2 dt af2 dt
Since supply in the case of urban renewal increases before
demand does, and prospectife middle-class in-migrants
are not indifferent to the level of rents, it is reasonable to
expect that in the short-run,
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dr t.4 . 4A.5
dt
i.e. the post-renewal median rents for h2 is less or equal
then the pre-renewal rent level for h At the same time,
the decrease in r2 (which may be 0) will not be as large
as the increase in r1 . Hence:
dr -> 0 since d dr 4A,6
d 1 ) -2
dt ~ ~ d I It~2 A
The vacancy rate for h1 will be quite small (possibly negative)
and v2 will also be low, though not as low as vi. Therefore:
v-4 0 4A.7
since y (pre-renewal) > 0
and dv, dv2<0
dt dt
Finally, average sales per resident increases, since df0 ) 0:
dt
ds ) 0 4A.8
df2
The second possible outcome is that the number of middle-and-
above income families remains constant:
df = 0 since df2 = 0 4B.0
dt dt
Therefore,
)r 2  dh2 0 and r df =0 4B.1
'h2  -2 -2=-2!h2 dt )f dt
So dr 2 40 4B.2
dt
and div2) 0 4B.3
dt
i.e. the vacancy rate for h2 is greater post-renewal than
pre-renwal.
On the other hand, v2 and r2 do not significantly affect
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r1 ; i.e., h2 are still priced above hi. However, there is the
possibility 6f increased filtering, a possibility which was
absent in 4A. Therefore, although
1I0 dv1 4C0 4B.4
dt dt
still hold, the absolute increases or decreases in rent level
and vacancy rates will be less than in 4A.
Similarly it still seems likely that
dr ) 0 4B.5
dt
though again, less than in 4A.
Finally, average sales per person remain constant,
d -.. 0 4B.6
dt
The third possible outcome is a net decrease in number
of middle-and-above income families (which is the case in the
absence of urban renewal) again, given urban renewal:
df < 0 since df2<O 4C.0
dt dti
As with 4B.2, 4B.3,
dr2<0 dv2) 0 4C.1
dt dt
though the changes are larger (absolutely) than in 4B. As
a consequence, there is an increased likelihood of accelerated
filtering, serving to minimize the rise in r1 . If - df
dt
and dh 2 are large, there is the possibility that drI-;,0.
ir- dt dt
In any case,
dr < 0 4C.2
dt
If rentiers of r choose to reduce rents significantly (tnd/or
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convert downwardly) rather than face high vacancy rates, then
these units become - in effect - hi. Then both vI and v2will
approach their pre-renewal levels. Finally,
dLS 0 4C.3
dt
The implication of these three possible situations are rather
interesting and straightforward and anabgous to a statement of
Grigsby's:
If middle and low-income families must depend
on upper-income households for a supply of ade-
quate housing rather than obtaining better homes
directly through some form of subsidy, then either
the mobility or the relative size of the latter
group must increase. 15.
Now from the viewpoint of the "interests" of the city as we- and
urban renewal - have defined them, 4A is the most desirable
situation, 4B undesirable, and 4C the least desirable, Hlowever,
from the perspective of low-income families, 4C clearly represents
the case of accelerated filtering which will be translated into
increases in the quality of units and decreases in the level of
median rents. Therefore, the interests of low-income groups
clearly run counter to the interests of the city; failure for
the latter represent a boon to the former.
However, outcomes such as 4B or 4C would not be permitted
to occur indefinitely. Either urban renewal will cease altogether,
a different form of urban renewal (e.g. eliminating diseconomies)
will be attempted, or measures will be taken to insure an outcome
such as 4A. We now look at this last possibility, since the first
two are not likely responses (yet) to "failure".
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Urban renewal is not a mechanistic phenomenon. That is
to say, there are a number of variables in the renewal process
over which the city has a good deal of control. Given that the
city'desires t*qkeep or entice middle income and above families,
the chief controlled variable is that of neigWIorhood effects.
The middle class has certain prejudices and desires, to which
the city must cater. The city is able to che5A. the location of
a project, and who will live in the area (post-renewal).
As we have seen, the city generally chooses a location close
to the downtown which is presently Inhabited by low-income
families. Usually both of these factors determine location,
neither alone is sufficient. Nothing is to be gained from the
city's point of view by renewing an area far from the downtown
(i.e., without a locational advantage) though inhabited by low-
income families. Similarly, there is no reason to renew an area
close to the downtown which is presently inhabited by middle
and upper income families.
4A is the outcome to which the city aspires. Clearly, if a
renewal area is ddemed undesirable by the middle and upper income
groups, 4B or 4C are the probable outcomen. The renewal area is
presently occupied by low-income families. The city knows that
if low income families are visible, middle and above income
groups will not move in;i.e., the latter are prejudiced against
the former. Whether there is total redevelopment or redevelopment
plus rehabilitation, the effect is to raise property values and
rdats in the renewal area. This result ensures that only middle
income groups can afford to live in the renewal area. Therefore,
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what is desired (replacement of lower- by middle - income) is a
consequence of renewal itself. Once an area is renewed the
percentage of low-income families residing in the area approaches
zero. This is ideally the case. However, if only a section of a
low-income area is renewed or if the renewal area though..
sufficiently large is bordered by low-income areas, "success"
may not be forthcoming. Whether success follows immediately or
not there i's a similar incentive for the city to undertake further
renewal. If a project is successful, a losing proposition can
only be averted by expanding the renewal area. In both instances,
the desire and consequences of renewal are to reduce the numbers
of low-income families in the renewal area, and to diminish
the number of areas in the city which are inhabited by low-income
families. The only limit on the renewal process would come with
the complete saturation of areas inhabited by low-income families.
When this saturation point is reached, further attempts to renew
the city for middle-and-abovd-income families are impossible.
60.
II. An Economic Justification of Urban ltenewal
In the previous section we discussed the consequences
of laisser-faire urban renewal, which are logically entailed
by the goals of raising property values and sales through
the means of satisfying the real and conceivable prejudices of
middle -and above- income families, whose residence in the city
is seen as the necessary condition for achieving the goals of
urban renewal. It was pointed out that all those -who have bepn
directly involved in urban renewal, whether for reform of profit,
believed the middle income component to be the crucial factor
in revivifying cities. Although the reformers have been critical
of the consequences of renewal, since they have accepted the
the major premise of the profit seekers, their criticismsihave
been neither convincing nor effectual.
There is an interesting parallel between the realm of
practical affairs where the dominant business interest o: the city
provided the rationale for urban renewal which was in turn .accepted
by the reformers and the realm of academic cost-benefit theory.
In this latter sphere we find that the conservative economists
have given a conservative economic justification of urban renewal
which has been both avnepted and extended by more liberal
economists. The so-called "prisonerl-Adilemma" model justifies
urban renewal on the grounds that it can "internalize externalities"
which is seen as "increasing the productivity of land." We
shall now make a criticaB evaluation of these concepts.
The conservative economists to whom we have referred are
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Davis andWhinston, whose views are presented in an article
entitled "The Economics of Urban Renewal."16 Their analysis
is based on "the individualistic basis of Western Civilization"
which vis-a-vis cost-benefitianalysis and urban renewal means
that if "the sum of benefits, measured bj changes in capital
values, ex'eeds the costs, then the action is termed desirable."17
To determine when this individualistic spirit ctnbe furthered, i.e.,
when capitaU values can be enhanced, they consider the prisoner's
dilemma - which conveniently abstracts from the social setting,
and seeks (nontheless) to show how interdependencies lead to urban
blight.
Since no one has suggested that lack of coordination among
landlords in middle and upper income areas justifies urban renewal
or leads to blight, the prisoner's dilemma model is applicable
- if at all - only to low income areas. Briefly, the model
contends that the total value of property in an area is related
to the quality of each individual structure. However, the
value of any individual property, A, can be enhanced if anothef
property, B, is improved. Therefore the ownerof A can receive
a higherr return if the owner of B improves its quality, while
the owner of A does nothing, even though the combined return on
A and B would be greater if they were both improved simultaneously.
But since each individual is a "profit maximizer" he doesen't
improve his .property, hoping someone else will improve his.
Hence, neither A nor B is improfed and blight persists and
gets worse. Therefore the government is justified in entering
as a deux ex machina, buying up A and B and turning them over
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to an entrepreneur, who will reap a higher profit than
did the recalcitrant slumlords. In this way the individualistic
spikit of Western Civilization - in terms of increased
capital values - is furthered. One wonders whether Davis
and Whinston would also apply their dilemma model to olgopolistic
industries, whose output and pricing policies cause divergences
between social and private benefits and costs. For example,
automobile companies follow policies of forced obsolescence,
price maintenance, and output restriction. At the same
time, the output (automobiles) cause uncompensated social costs
(pollution, deaths, congestion, and high insurance premiums).
Would nationalization of the auto industry - or substitution
of a single publicly supervised trust for the several oligopolists -
and operating it in the public interest further the "indivunalintin-
spirit of Western Civilization?" One rather doubts that
Davis and Whinston would advocate such a policy.
As for the problem as hand, we mentioned that Davis
and Whinston abstract from the social setting. Blighted
aneas are inhabited by the least mobile members of society,
by virtue of their low income or race. Therefore slumlords
have no motivation-to improve the quality of their buildings,
since they are in a seller's market. It is doubtful that
landlords could charge higher rents of present tenants even
if improvements were made. In a seller's market like slum housing
there is no reason to expect that price is related to quality.
There is only one way that blighted areas can be put to "nigher
use" and this entails the replacement of present rentiers
and other property owners by a large developer (chosen and
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subsidized by the renewal authority) and replacement of present
residents by those with higher incomes.
The policy implications of the "prisoner's dilemma
model" as applied to the lack of co-ordination among slumlords
is clearly an aberration of Scitovsky's justification of co-ordinated
investment decisions to maximize "'consumer's surplus" and
minimize pecuniary externalities. In the latter, co-ordination
leads to greater output with diminished price;. the significance
of this in our context is that not only are the sage goods
supplied, but their market price is reduced and more individuals
are able to afford them. Wereltthe implications of the lack of
co-ordinated investments by slumlords consistent with Scitovsky's
analysis, they would suggest how co-ordinated slumlord decisions
(if ppssible) or the centralized decision of the renewal authority
lead to enhanced quality (with no - or minimal - increase in
rents) or to decreased rents for units in blighted areas,
whether through rehabilitation or redevelopment. Needless to
say, the prisoner's dilemma model, insofar as it justifies the
form which urban renewal has hitherto taken, anticipates i change
in the goods supplied (i.e., replacement of lower - by higher -
priced units) and necessarily a decrease in the number of units
which low income families can afford.
The extention of the dilemma model is implied in
Rothenberg's concept of increased productivity of land.
Rothenberg maintains that the large-scale assembly of land made
possible by eminent domain creates internalized decision-making.1 8
After adjustment for changes in locational advantages and tax
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capitalization, the enhanced value of the land forming the
redevelopment site due to this internalization of externalities
represents the net benefits of the renewal project.1 9 Although
Nothenberg seeks to abstract the value of the land from the use
to which it is actually put, it.is obvious that land Ualue is
only relevant to an actual or potential use. Therefore, the
enhanced value of land is relative to its most profitable
potential use. The whole notion of increased productivity
of land is operationally capable of being applied only to low-income
and (especially) blighted or slum areas, and as such serves as
a justification for urban renewal in its present form. The productivity
of land in Beverly Hills, California could be increased by
leveling all the structures and pumping for oil. But it is
unlikely that such a productivity enhancing program would be
advocated. And in general, the replacement of residences by
industry (or highways) will always increase the productivity of
land keven before the industry of highway is constructed).
Yet industries manage to find locations Bot presently used for
residences, though highways have a tendency to be located in
low-income areas.
The essential tendentiousness of "increased productivity
of land" is this: whenever there is a concentration of low-income
families in an area with locational advantages, it is always possible
to increase the value of the land through redevelopment or
rehabilitation (and expelling the low income families). The land
heed not actually be redeveloped; its potential use for higher
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income groups will in itself raise the productivity of the land
in that particular area. This concept of increased productivity
merely gives an objective patina to the belief that central city land
is "too good" for low income families. The facts that blighted
areas exists and that the value of land therein can be elevated
are not consequences of the lack of co-ordination among
slumlords; they are consequences of the lack of mobility
(i.e., the race and low income) of those forced to live in slums.
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III. theInefficiency of Slums
Since it is generally slums which are chosen for renewal,
it is not surprising that renewal authorities and some
coat-benefit analysts seek to ascribe certain social costs
to slums as physical entities - costs which are ostensibly
eliminated by urban renewal. ThiA tendency has led Glazer to
remark:
Planners have compared the costs of police, welfare,
and other social services of an area to be leveled
with the reduced costs after rebuilding, neglecting
to take into account the fact that the costs are
incurred not by neighborhoods or buildings but by people.2 0
Not only are such social costs merely shifted to a new
location within the city, but they are often exacerbated
in the process and new ones are created. If displaced
individuals move into existing slums, the maintenance costs
associated with these are likely to increase, while if they
move into non-blighted low rent areas, these are likely
lto become slums. On the other hand, if displacees move into
standard housing, new problems are created. Schorr cites
a case where desplacees procured better housing which forced
them to decrease expenditures on food, resulting in a higher
death rate than formerly.2 1 In any cgse, there aretthe
psychological problems of readjustment and possible scars of
being treated as,-an object, possible loss of livelihood, and the
removal costs. Thes costs will be considered in our
cost-benefit ochbmal
The other extreme is the fatalistic view of Davis and
Whinston: since the poor are always with us, and as they can't
afford decent housing, slums way be efficient.22 However,
slums are somewhat more than substandard housing and other individuals
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besides adult slum residents are affected by the social
and environmental conditions of slums. It will be instructive
to consider for whom and in what ways slums are inefficient, for
slues mean different things to different groups. By slums
we mean concentrations of immobile individuals - immobile by
virtue of low income or dark pigmentation. -.
It has been argued that if one asserts that poverty and
bigotry ard the sufficient causes of slums, then it is inconsistent
to also impute an inefficiency to slums. However, in the urban
setting, given racial and economic segregation on the one had,
and poverty on the other, all that slums signify is the- o
environment of these immobile individuals. Being poor or non-white
means living in a blighted area. The elimination of the physical
structures in a slum in no way decreases the sufficient cause
of slums. The displacees are still poor or non-white and -
in the absence of increased income - must move into environments
which are or become similar to the pre-renewal slum. In saying
that slums are (inefficient, we are saying that poverty entails
the concentration of the most vulnerable members of society. Were
these individuals given employment with a decent wage or a
"guaranteed minimum income" there would be no slums. Concentrations
of non low-income families are not inefficient; nor are such
concentrations slums.
The following list suggests in whinh ways slums are inefficient
for different groups:
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1. For slum dwellers:
.a. lack of economic opportunity
b. high predisposition to social pathology (addiction, crime, etc.)
c. lack of economic or ethnic integration
d. exploitation by landlords and merchants2 3
e. substandard public services (health, education, recreation)
2. For the city as an economic and political unit:
a. above average expenditures for fire, police, and welfare
b. less than average property tax revenue
3. For society as a whole:
a. the expense of supporting a lumpenproletariat, i.e., the
opportunity costs of un -and-under-:-em loyed individuals
b. the external cost generated by poverty (prisons, mental
hospitals, "bad image abroad," injury to National Quardsmen)
4. For downtown merchants:
a. if slums are close to the downtown, their cost is equivalent
to the increased sales made possible by converting the
area into residences for middle - and above - income families
5. For large developers:
a etj eiination of slums through urban renewel makes possible
riskless profits
This list does not exhaust the groups for whom slums are inefficient,
and nothing is said regarding those groups for whom slums are
efficient, e.g., merchants, pushers, slumlords, and A04
which prefer racial and economic segregation. Our point is that
-lumt are ineffidient for differentagrdupsifot dissimilar reasons.
Moreover, for certain groups, slums are inefficient by virtue of
their location alone. From the viewpoint of downtown merchants, it
is inefficient for concentrations of low-income individuals
to live close to the downtown. For these mercharts, it is
eminently desirable that laisser-faire urban renewal ensue and
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that it be successful. It is in their interest that slums
move from the downtown area, not that the causes of slums
be dealtwith. However, for slum dwellers and societf&-
as a whole it is slums per se which are inefficient, and not
just their location. An important fallacy of urban- renewal
is that it acts as if the location of slums were the problem
rather than the existence of slums, no matter where. By
incorporating the objectioNs to slums of certain groups (downtown
merchants and large scale developers) and ignoring the etiology
of slums and the magnitude of costs which they inflict on other
groups (slum dwellers and society at large), it is not
surprising that urban renewal notoonly creates new social
costs, but also does not diminish the incidence of slums.
Now supposing that our laisser-faire model of urban renewal is
not accepted as corresponding to reality. It still must be
demonstrated that a paticular urban renewaa project decreased
the number of slum dwellers without causing a net deckease
in their welfare and in thatrof. ther low-icnome individuals
who are affected by the consequences of the project. In sum,
the redevelopment of a slum in no wa y implies that the social
costs associated with the poverty of its (pre-reniewal) residents
or with other low-income individuals in the city have in the
aggregate been reduced.
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IV. The Least-Cost Criterion in Urban Renewal
P. Steiner has set forth a proposition which justifies
.-in certain circumstances - a short-cut approach to cost-benefit
analysis:
benefit measurement is hard, and time-consuming
a$d should be undertaken only when required. 2 4
If the benefit are fixed, then it is possible to base project
selection on a least-cost criterion. In order for benefits
to be fixed, the alternative projects must be perfect substitutes,
producing and undifferentiable output. Projects which m oet these
conditions are generally of the public works variety: irrigation,
electrification, flood control, and transportation, facilities.
Where objectives are not equivalent to the direct services
of a public activity, or there are a multiplicity of (poss.ibly
conflicting) objectives, or where the question of who loses and
who gains is not incidental, under these circumstances, a
least-cost ciriterion is not applicable. In short, while
public worksty.pe projects are not ombi tious, urban renewal'is.
Urban renewal does not directly provide services in the way that
a power plant produces electricity. It is inconceivable that
electrification could impede economic development. However,
theresare-iinumerablevvariations in the kindsedf prgjebts
which can be undertaken and instrumental goals which can be
emphasized in r.enewal. Consequently, it is possible that projects
can be selected which bear no relation to the long-run goal
of renewal, i.e., revitalizing cities. Although certain
groups benefit consistently by certain urban renewal
policies, it does not follow that social welfare in the aggregate
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is enhanced. Since it it precisely the immediate objectives
of urban renewal which must be scrutinized, it would be inapposite
to take these as givens.
A.H.,Schaaf has recently attempted to judge urban renewal
of the basis of alternative costs. 25 He has assumed that t e
ultimate goal of urban renewal is to bring all residential
structures up to certain standards. These - the code compliance
standard and the long term renewal standard - define the fixed
benefits. Either one or the other of these standards is a
given, and the alternative cost is considered in relation to
rehabilitation and replacement. Whichever of these two methods
achieves "the publicly stipulated renewal sta3dard" more cheaply
it preferred. 2 6
Although Schaaf chides renewal officials against predicating
renewal policies on the return of middle and upper income groups,
one wonders what Apgetus there would be for establishing renewal
standards without such an expectation. At the same time, Schaaf
is rather reticent on the question of who is to benefit by
compliance with the renewal standtrds. There will certainly be
costs to low-income families, who will be faced with higher
housing costs. Schaaf however concentrates on the costs
to landlords, whc.profit calculations determine whether they will
renew or withdraw their property from the morket. The costs
which they face are diminshed by public expenditures for
environmental igprovements and liberal financing. The
residents of blighted areas do not enter into the decision matrix.
If slumlords decide to comply with the standards, slumdwellers
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can expect higher rents (which are often excessive in any case)
or eviction; if they do not comply, slumdwellers are certain of
displacement, since the property will either be withdrawn from
the market or redevelopment will ensue. While Schai.f points out
that "someone" must bear the costs of urban renewal, he is as
unclear about who that "someone" is as lie is about who benefits.
In fact, his whole analysis is not concerned with either the
benefits or costs of urban renewal; he merbly wishes to point
out that it sometimes costs less to rehabilitate a structure than
to demolish it and construct a new one.2 7 Cetainly costs of
this sort should be minimized, just as the renewal authority should
use competitive bidding and abstain from graft. But there are
many other costs in urban renewal - costs which do not involve
a cash flow and may be nevertheless more significant than
the construction costs. It is fallacious to consider that
only costs which involve a cash flow are real costs, just as
it is misleading to assume that the benefits of urban renewal
are fixed. (We hope to avoid both these mistaken views in
the cost-benefit analysis scheme which is presented in the
final chapter.)
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V. An Either-Or View of Urban Renewal
Implied in much of this chapter is an either-or view of
urban renewal. Urban renewal monies can either be used to induce
middle. and above income families to move into the city and
increase the level of rents~andisaLes and possidly the
tax base; or urban renewal monies can be used to eliminate
social and physical diseconomies and their causes and raise
the level of municipal services. The former approach, though
short-sighted - is understandable: the city once had many more
middle and upper income families than it now possesses. Tuhe
decline of the city proceeded pari passu with the outmigration
of these affluent groups. In order for the city to rise again,
these groups must be induced to return to the city.
Whether or not such a shift is desirable in the first place,
suburbanites and exurbanites are not going to move to the city so
long as substantial diseconomies are to be found there. Although
thb slum elimination cum project approach has been justified
by certain analysts on the grounds that unco-ordinated decisions
of landlords in blighted areas are inefficient, the mere co-ordination
of decisions or substitution of centralized decision making do
not ipso facto come to terms with the crucial objections to
atomistic decision making. Pigou justified municipal planning
on the grounds that it was "idle to expect a wtll-planned town
to result from the independent activities of isolated speculators."2 8
The question remains as to what municipal planning ought to
accomplish; how does co-ordinated decision making lead to more
desirable outcomes than does isolated speculation? So long
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as planning satisfies social wants it automatically increases
social welfare. The collective warnts which Pitou felt a municipal
authority ought ti satisfy were those "of beauty, of air, and
of light."2 9 Few would deny that these collective wants,
to which can be added such gf5c?3 4 diseconomies as noise, congestion,
lack of open space and pedestrAin mobility, are far from being
satisfied in American cities. Ironically, urban renewal has had
almost no positive effect on either satisfying these social wants
or eliminating the related diseconomies. In fact, urban renewal
has itself been a from of speculation. A small area of the city
is dramatically changed, while the rest of the city - aside from
new sluss created by the project displacees - remains unaltered.
Renewal authorities apparently hope that prospective in-digrants
will base their decisions to move back on the amenities in the
one rebuilt area. ut thistisiwishful thinking. Por the overally
undesirable aspects of city living have in no way been improved.
In fact, the return of more affluent indi'vidualsAmore private
automobiles and hence more congestion and air pollution. In
sum, there is no reason for affluent individuals to return to
cities in their present condition; shoul& those individuals
return, the basic problems of urban America will not be resol'ved.
These basic problems are both physical and social (poverty) and
any resuscitation of American cities will only be a consequence
of eliminating these root problems.
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CHAPTER THREE
A COST-BENEFIT SCHEMA
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I. THE RELEVENT POPULATION
Johansen has pointed out that where municipalities have
"complete freedom" to determine tax rates, there will be con-
siderable variations in the taxation level from one municipality
to another. Capital, labor, and residents are attracted to
municipalities with lower tax levels. In the USA it is the
suburbs which have been able to attract industry and residents
through low tax rates while central cities have had to increase
their tax rates merely to keep the level of services at a
minimum. Consequently, the inequalities in the level of per
capita income between cities and suburbs have increased. There
are other pertinent factors. Certain political decisions have
contributed to suburbanization, chiefly large-scale subsidised
insured mortgages for single-family homes following W1W II and
enormous expenditures for metropolitan highways (rather than
mass transit). There are however important reasons for sub-
urbanization aside from responses to federal allocations and
tax rate differentials. For residents, the diseconomies associated
with urban life in the USA seem most significant. The de-
centralization of industries has been abetted by a decentralized
labor force as well as by many of the same factors which induced
the outmigration of individuals. Industries have been able to
minimize certain fixed costs (e.g. land cost) as well as
variable ones, property tax payments (if expansion is anticipated)
and transportation time by decentralizing. Differential tax
rates have influenced all outmigration decisions, but ether
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equally important phenomena have also affected the locational
decisions of firms and households.
Urban renewal is mainly financed at the national level,
indicating that the problems confronting cities are national
in scope. It is assumed that cities are worth preserving in
their traditional form. More precisely, it is not the case that
urban renewal envisages either cities becoming one-class or one-
race enclaves or metropolitan areas becoming ribbons of high-
way connecting various other activities, as in LA. (One critic
of urban renewal, Scott Greer, disagrees with both these assump-
tions. 2) Insofar as urban renwal represents an intergovernmental
transfer, it is taking cognizance of the inability of cities to
compete with suburbs in attractingiindustries and residents
and of the concomitant factors, viz., higher tax rates and low
levels of services for cities vis-a-vis suburbs. Were urban
renewal funds utilized for improving the level of city services
or dliminating diseconomies, societal benefits would be equivalent
to the increased level of satisfied social wants. However, when
urban renewal funds are used tolinfluence the locational decisions
of firms and households, it is conceivable that no net societal
benefits will be forthcoming - even if existing diseconomies
are not exacerbated.
Arrow has suggested that:
All benefits are, in the last analysis, benefits
to individuals whom we may think of as consumers,
but the relation may be indirect, through facili-
tating the production of goods desired by consumers. 3.
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Suppose that an industry is induced to move to a city through
a write-down made possible by urban renewal. It may be that
from the perspective of the whole society it would have been
better had the industry actually remained outside the city.
If its employees are suburbanites, they must spend more time
comnuting in the city, or, the firm itself may be a monopoly.
Looked at another way, suppose the firm would have located
somewhere else in the absence of the write-down. Therefore,
the use of the write-down in no way increased potential benefit
accruing to society as the result of the firm's operations.
The write-down only reduced the initial capital investment
of the firm. At the same time, the monies involved in the
write-down could have been used for some other purpose, one
whose cominag to fruition was dependent upon public expenditures
(e.g., low-rent housing or improved education or a park).
The principal objection to the use of urban renewal funds
for influencing locational decisions is that it represents an
unwarranted subsidization of certain groups. Unwarranted, because
social benefits are not increased by using public funds to make
one locational decision more expensive than another, when the
opposite decision would have been the case in the absence of
such subaidies. It may have been undesirable for the federal
government to have subsidized suburbanization for a decade,
but to subsidize de-suburbanization without increasing the
overall quality of urban life does atrectify the original policy.
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Making suburbs worse off in order to (possibly) make cities
better off in the short run (i.e., , -. ' attracting middle
income suburbanites through subsidized housing) is a self-
defeating policy. As regards cost-benefit analysis the deter-
mination of whether urban renewal hax merely altered locations
of households or firms necessitates an examination of the
objectives and consequences of the project under examination.
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II. THEn CATEGORIE OF COST-'BEEFIT ANALYSIS
Our approach to cost-benefit measurement has two distinctive
characteristics. We attempt (1) to take into account all social
costs and benefits which accrue to different income groups and
(2) to add an adjustment coefficient to costs and benefits which
accrue to different income groups. For the reasons discussed in
the two previous chapters, we assume that benefits and costs do
not have an equal weight for individuals of different income
levels. It is undesirable if aproject furthers inequality,
while projects which serve to equalize income are ceteris paribus
desirable.4 The multiplicity of objectives in urbn renewal
suggests that the city has a rather wide latitude in choosing
which objectives best contribute to increasing the welfare of
its residents. It is not the case that slum elimination or
provision of merit goods (via subsidization) to middle-and-
above income families are mandatory. If projects which seek
these instrumental ends are chosen, the choice has been vol-
untarily made by the city. The goals enumerated by the Report
of the Special Commission on Low-Income Housing of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts are certainly not inconsistent
with tenable urban renewal projects. They include5
1. the creation of sound, stable, and viable communities.
2. the provision of maximum freedom of choice
3. the development of balanced neighborhoods of diverse
sodal, economic, and ethnic groups.
The city orgaban renewal agency does not solely blear land
and sell it to the highest bidder, ike., the public is not
indifferent to the kind of project which is undertaken. This
follows from the fact that urban renewal is a public undertaking
with a public purpose. Land and subsidies are allocated to
developers so as to achieve the public purpose. A Land Disposition
between the Boston Redevelopment Authority and a private developer
states:
The Redeveloper will devote the property to
the uses specified in the controls and the
plan and will comply with the requirements
thereby specified and will not use the property
or any part thereof or devote the same to any use
other than the said permitted uses. 6.
A c6st-benefit analysis of urban renewal must evaluate the
sum of benefits from - and consequent to - the kind of project
which is actually undertaken. To speak of increased value or
land apart from the use to which the land is put tells one very
little either about the goals - or efficacy - of urban renewal.
Diverse kinds of renewal projects are conceivable satisfying
social and/or merit wants and being, undertaken and operated by
entrepreneurs or governments. All projects should be evaluated
in the same manner irrespective of their type of proprietorship.
We shall now discuss costs and benefits of urban renewal
formally and partially, saving for later sections the substantive
and general aspects of cost-benefit measurement. The formal
discussioh of costs and benefits considers the various cate-
gories under which the costs and benefits are to be subsumed,
without investigatingtthe specific costs and benefits which
ensue in urban renewal. This initial discussion is partial in
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the sense that certain aspects of cost-benefit analysis
are excluded. These excluded components include (1) social
opportunity costs, (2) socialfime preference and (3) effects
on municipal tax base and level of services, and an analysis
of whether the renewal project has merely altered locational
decisions (in which case the partial view of benefits will
overstate the actub4 contribution of the project to social
welfare), Needless to say, an adequate analysis of urban
renewal entials a general cost-benefit model* However, the
general consequences of urban renewal can be appraised with
greater precision after the partial analysis is completed.
While it is true that all benefits are social benefits,
a distinction has been made between those benefits which are
actuallyappropriated, and those which are not. Those benefits
which are appropriated have been called private benefits if
the goods or services were provided by an entrepreneur. This
private provision may or may not be the case in urban renewal.
It is less ambiguous therefore to consider them as appropriated
benefits, whether appropriated by a firm or a government
(say, in operating a muncipal garage). Of the benefits which
follow from the provision of a good or service but are external
in the sense that the provider of the good or service either
can not or does not appropriate them, i.e., charge for the enjoy-
ment, there are two types. One we have already discussed, i.,e.,
technologicakl externalities.''The second external benefit
represents the non-appropriated benefits enjoyed by the
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direct consumers of the project. Before giving a brief
description of this second type of external benefit, which
we call Consumers' Benefits, it will be instructive to give
a brief account of the concept of consumer's surplus. We do
not use this concept because of certain conceptual problems.
However, once'these problems are overcome (which we have not
been able to do) it will be of great importance in cost-benefit
analysis. In any case, our concepts of Consumer's Benefits and
Price Effect Benefits (to be discussed) have been inspired
by the concept of consumer's surplus.
The concept of consumer's surplus has been used in
theoretical cost-benefit analysis, but does not seem to have
actually been applied to compute benefits.8 The theory under-
lying consumer's surplus is that whenever a demand curve is
downward sloping, and the marginal utility of money is constant',
a decrease in price and increase in quantity supplied for a good
which is already being consumed provides the consumer with a
surplus of enjoyment. Since the good was being consumed at
the higher price some individuals were willing to pay for it
at that price so they save with a reduction in price and are
able to consume more at the lower price. So long as the quantity
supplied is greater than zero and there is no price discrimination,
there is always a consumer's zurplus, since willingness to
pay is given by the total area under the demand curve between
zero and the quantity supplied, and this area is greater than the
area given by price actually paid x quantity supplied.
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The concept of consumers' surplus in this form hinges
on the notiDn of willingness to pay which obviously depends
on the given distribution of income. At the same time, the
actual.,willingness to pay is an empirical question, even more
difficult to determine than the demand curve itselfl Most
problematic of all is the underlying premise, that demand
curves can simply be added without any adjustments for the
fact that "demand" is proportional to income. As has been
mentioned, once a method for adjusting the sum of individual
demand curves is arrived at (which approximates "one man,
one vote"), the concept should become operational.
Our concept of Consumers' Benefits is derived neither
from willingness to pay nor from demand curves. It rests on
the assumption that a renewal project will often provide
services to its direct consumers (e.g., tenants in a
housing project) which are of a higher quality than are
similar services outside the project in the same price range.
What we are interested in calculating is the difference between
the price consumers pay for the services of the project and
the price which a comparable service (or good) fetches in
the private market. Alteriatively, -we are interested in cal-
culating the different between the quality of services offered
to consumers of the projects and the quality of services which
are similar (though not necessarily comparable, i.e., of
equal quality) and in the same price range. In either case,
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the price or quality comparison is made after the project is
completed, taking into account post-renewal prices of similar
non-project services. The reason for considering post- rather
than pre-renewal prices for similar services is due to the fact
that the project itself may serv.e'" to alter the prices of
similar non-project services. The effect of the project on the
supply of similar servides is (one kind of) what we term Price
Effect Benefits (or Costs) and this is the last kind of benefit
which we consider. (The calculation of Consumers' Benefits will
be discussed more fully below.)
When the project is itself an input for other goods or
services, and no appropriation is exacted, we have External
(technological) Benefits. When the project changes the supply
of other goods or servicds, we have Price Effect Benefits (and
Casts). For example, the project may increase the supply of
middle rent housing and decrease the supply of low rent housing.
Hence, tenants in middle rent housing pay less than they did
formerly for housing of the same quality, while landlords of
low rent housing charge higher rents than they did pre-renewal
for housing of the same (low) quality. Therefore, both middle
rent tedahts and low rent landlords receive Price Effect Benefits.
We have then three classes of benefits: those which are
actually appropriated by the provider of the service or good;
those which are not appropriated (including External Benefits and
Consumers' Benefits); and those which are consequences of changes
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in the supply of goods or services, i.e., Price Effect Benefits.
For benefits, we use the following notation: B are the
total social benefits; Ba are the benefits which are appropriated;
B are the External Eiconomies; B are the Consumers' Benefits;
e c
and B are the Price Effect Benefits. So we have:
p
B = B + B + B + B
a e c p
Since costs are the obverse 6f benefits, we have a similar
scheme for them. The counterpwrt of appropriated benefits are
compensated costs, by which one generally means renumeration
for factors of production. (land, labor, and capital). As we
have seen in our discussion of social discount rates and
social opportunity costs, it may be necessary to impute a
cost to labor ("shadow wage rate") and to choose a discount
rate which diverges from the actual market rate of interest.
However, this bill depend on the nature of the project and the
goals behind its implementation. The counterpart of 1e are
External Diseconomies, though there need not be a one-to-one
correlation. That is, there can be B without C , and in
general, the presence of one as W result of a renewal project
does not entail the presence of the other. On the other hand,
whenever there are B , there are always Price Effect Costs.
In the illustration we gage for Bp, there will be Price Effect
Costs for landlords of middle rent housing and for tenants of
low rent housing. More enerally, if the project reduces the
supply of certain goods or services or confers a locational
advantage on certain activities, some entrepreneurs, rentiers,
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and consumers are made better off, while some are made
worse off. Price Effect Costs can also occur when there
are B for rentiers in the area adjoining the project.
In this case Price Effects Costs will rppresent the
moving and adjustment costs for tenants who are forced
to move from the adjoining area because they are unable
to afford the increased rentals entailed by the B in-
creasing the value of land in these areas. The final cost
we consider is what Pearce and Sturmey have termed "ex-
ploitation", i.e. the undercompensation of compensated
costs. While they had in mind the exploitation of
workers in the ausence of organization, urban renewal
provides other examples of potential under compensation,
some of which have figured prominently in criticisms of
the operations of urban renewal. Undercompensation of
compensated costs is a measure of the difference between
what individuals who are displaced by renewal receive
from the Renewal Agency and the actual costs which they
incure These actual costs include moving costs and such
readjustment costs as psycholbgical problems, loss of Q*-
?toyment or income, rises in rents which are not accounted
for by the general rise in rents, i.e., Cp, and similar
readjustment costs, which will be discussed more fully below.
The symbols for social costs are as follows: C are
the total social costs; Ca are the compensated costs; C,
are the External Diseconomies; - C are the
Prme E~hc: Costs 1 qn Ckk ar- th
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undercompensation of compensated costs. The total social
cost equation is given by:
C- C + C + C + C
a e p u
B-C does not represent the net benefits of an urban renewal
project. Some social discount rate must be chosen to make
comparable benefits and costs which accrue at different points
in time. Similarly, the benefits foregone in choosing one pro-
jeet rather than another and (where applicable) divergences
between social costs and market prices, i.e., social opportunity
costs, must also be calculated. We leave the consideration of
opportunity costs and discount rates vis-i-vis urban renewal
to a later section, since they are intimately related to the
kind of project which is actually undertaken- its objebtives
did'inputh. There is one adjustment that, must be gade irrespective
of the kind of project which is actually undertaken and this is
for the distribution of costs and benefits to income groups;
The adjustment for compensated costs, Ca, is not based on the
income group of gainers or losers as with the other types of
benefits and costs. For C the type of adjustment needed
relates to opportunity costs, i.e., whether Ca, ought to be
inflated or deflated. We have ilready discussed the political
(or ideological) context of "consumer voting" and related
concepts given an unequal distribution of income. We have
also stressed that poverty itself produces diseconomies and
any projects which make the rich richer and the poor poorer
exacerbate diseconomies. Most observers agree that tic problems
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of cities (of inadequate housinr 12, of physical and social
pathologies, of high containment costs) are all directly or
indirectly related to poverty. The elimination of poverty
would obviously obviote the form which urban renewal has
hitherto taken, and would enable cities to tackle their other
ci-ucial problems, i.e., those of physical diseconomies. In
sum, it makes no sense to talk of renewing cities if phy#sical
and social diseconomies are ignored or exacerbated. B, awd
C can be theoretically calculated like other components of
B and C. However the social diseconomies associated with
poverty and the inequal distribution of income are exacerbated
or meliorated in relation to all components of B and C.
Therefore, multipliers (or coefficients) must be attached to
all the components of B and C (except C ), according to the
income level of individuals who bear costs or receive benefits. 1 3
We first look ad adjusted B and adjusted C in a general
way, i.e., without specifying the coefficients or number of
income groups, since the coefficients we Phoose are merely
suggestive. The formula for adjusted net benefits is:
1- y, i C e-- bene (tY CUi4C i=C14~,1s8VL-r-1 bev-ie42iAs
Where i represents income groups and i; is a variable coefficient
whose value is determined by i. For gross B:
fAi 
-+ X Bpi + X[ 'cY, ~ ~ ~ ~ xKiD+CAi?)-
1=1J
And for C:
xic( t ;iCei 4 XjC i + X C ; 4 CCaj
i=L i=1
If one desired a specificity of five income groups,
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i = 1,2,3,4,5 where one is the lowest income group and five,
the highest, there would be five values of xi; (say) a,b,c,d,e
where the values of x correspond to the values of i in the
same position. The values of x. are inversely proportional to
I
the'income of the group to which they relate. Hence;
i X.
1
1 a
2 b Where a;; b 7c 7d 7e
3 c and income of group 1C2<3<4(5
4 d
5 e
It seems advantageous to take the value of x3 corresponding to
the median income group as unity, i.e., equal to 1. Given
inequality, we are more indifferent to costs and benefits
accruing to individuals in the median income group than we
are to gains or losses to lower or higheriincome groups.
If B or C accrue indiscriminately, i.e., independently
of the income of rebipients, we first determine whether they
qccrue only to residents of the city or both to residents 6f
the city and to those of the metropolitan area. If only to
residents of the city, then coefficients and the relative
magnitudes of the B and C should proportional to each
e p
incomae group as a percentage of the totilpopulation of the
city. For example, if B amounts to $50,000 for one year and if
income group I comprises 35% of the total population of the city,
then .35 x $50,000 x the appropriate coefficient accrues to
members of income group 1. If B or Ce accrue to both residents
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of the city and to residents of the metropolitan area,
then we determine the respective percentages accruing to
city and non-city residents, and they"follow the same procedure.
For example, if' 75% of the $50,000 accrue to members of the
city, then the Be to income group 1 are .35 x .75 x $50,000 x
the appropriate coefficient + .15 (the percentage of group 1
of the non-city metropolitan population) x .25 x $50,000 x
the appropriate coefficient (which is the same as for
Group 1 in the city).
We offerthe following chart as a plausible breakdown
of income groups. The figures in the first column represent
the .poverty level for families of different sizes and age
compositions. The figures in the first column are taken
directly from M. Orshanksy of the U.S. Dept. of H.E.W.14
As the base family size we use the family of four. A family
of four with an income less than $4000 per year is in income
group 1; with less than $6000, in group 2; with less than
$7500 in group 3; with less than $1500Q group 4; wnd with
more than $15,000, group 5. To determine what income group
a family above the poverty level with more or less than four
members should be placed in, we have simply used the income
ratios for families of four: thus the upper income limit for
a family of three to be considered as members of income group
2 is 6000 = 3 x 3160 = 4740
4000 2
and for a family of two (over 65) to be considered members
92.
of group three its income must be greater than
3 x 2460 = 3690
and less than
7500 = 1.25 x 3690 = 4613.
6000
The multipliers (or what might be called the coefficients
of deprivation) which weight costs and benefits to individuals
in different income groups are multiples of the unity coefficient
for income group 3 (for a family of four, more than $6000
per year and less than $7500). They appear at the bottom of
the chart.
COEFFICIENTS WHICH ADJUST COSTS AND BENEFITS TO DIFFERENT INCOME GROUPS
I
*Numberri*
Family
1.
1
2
2
Age of Head
(ii' relevant)
under 65
over 65
under 65
over 65
Yearly Income for Group:1, i1-1,2,3,h,5
)less than
1885
1745
275
2460
360 (2
4000
4675
3
less than
2828
:6)18
4073
3690
h740
60000
7013
6 5250 7875
7 or more 6395 9593
less than less than
3531
3273
5091
4613
5925
7500
8766
9844
11991
7062
6546
10182
9226
10182
9226
11850
1500o0 15000
1753217532
19688 19688
2218222182:
Coefficient (xi) Associated
with Costs and Benefits to
Income Group, i 2.0 .
greater or
equal to
7062
6546
. 5
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III. .APPROPRIATED BEN.17ITS B
The distinctive characteristic of B is that a cash flow
is always involved and for this reason Ba has often been considered
private benefits, since the value of the good produced or service
rendered is appropriated. However, since the good or service
can be provided publicly as well as privately, the important
point is that consumers pay something and benefits are therefore
appropriated by an entrepreneur - public or private.
Consider three types of renewal projects or elements of
a renewal project: housing, retail stores, and a community
center. For each element we distinguish between entrepreneur
and consumers and hence between profits on the one hand and
rents, sales, and fees (prices) on the other. Taking housing
first, to maice our point we introduce two unrealistic
assumptions: the discount rate is zero and benefits are
yielded at a constant rate of $100,000 per year for forty
years:1 0
D Benefits yfert dt
a 0
since r = 0
(O
= y dt
= 40y
since y = 100,000
= 4,000,000
Ba after 40 years is $4,000,000. Now assuming a 20% return
on rents (after taxes), $800,000 has accrued to the rentier
and $3,200,000 to the tenants. Assuming that the rentier is
in income group 4 and the tenants in income group 3, adjusted
B a is (.75)$800,000 + (1) $3,200,000. Da can be figured in
a similar way for the retail stores and the community center.
There are complications if the retail stores have monopoly
privileges, in which case Ba will be excessive, and C must
take account of this. Since we assume the community center
to be publicly operqted, the coefficient for profits will
be 1 while the coefficient for price minus profit will depend
on the income of the group utilizing the facility.
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IV. EXTERNAL ECONOMIES B
e
With external economies, we enter into the realm of
benefits which have traditionlly been disregarded, since
no cash flow is involved. These are the benefits for which
no payment can be - oriis - exacted. Elements of projects
or single projects which satisfy social or merit wants can
yield B .
Suppose the conmnunity center has a nursery school and
it is built in a low-income area. If the staff and facilities
of the nursery school are of a high caliber, the children may
be so inspired that they no longer take their present environment
as a given. If the nursery school contributes to breaking
the cycle of poverty, not only the children and their parents
gain, but the society also gsins, and this societal B can be
e
calculated. We determine what the probability would be of
the children of individuals with a certainiincome or race to
have a poverty line income. We also determine the probability
of the children acquiring social pathologies agair given their
social situation. In general the procedure for calculatingr Bt- e
associated with merit goods entails aniinvestigation of the
needs the merit goods satisfy arnd costs to society in the
absence of such merit goods. For example, Aid to Dependent
Children and orphanages might be associated with the absence
of birth control clinics. Similarly, welfare payments (and
social workers' salaries) are associated with inadequate
opportunities. As was pointed out in Chapter I, Section (6)
the fact that merit wants are satisfied means benefits accrue
to groups which are not direct consumers of the merit goods.
It remains with the analyst to determine what Be is associated
with a particular iaerit good and the general way to look at
this is to determine the costs to society ia the absence of
certain merit goods of given quality. For example, the provih ion
of public housing (of the sort Jane Jacobs and others criticize)
will decrease expenditures for fire and physical health. However,
public homing of a high quality or publicly provided housing
with opportunities for individuals to form a cooperative (i.e.
become owners) will often serve to foster autonomy, thus
decreasing public expeaditines for welfare, mental health,
police and national guard. As a final example, suppose that
retail cooperatives are elements in an urban renewal project
in a low-income area. The benefits would include Ba (all of
which are appropriated by the consumer-operators), they would
include the reduction in price occasioned by the elimination
of (exploitation by) slum merchants, and the benefits associated
with fostering autonomy and cooperation among hitherto apathetic
and vulnerable poor. This latter possibility indicates that
the severing of dependency relations can have an important
role to play in reducing anomie, and breaking the perpetuation
of p.overty, with the presence of which are associated social
costs with price tags (mental illness, police, national guard,
dope addiction, etc.)
In urban renewal Be will often be occasioned by an amenity
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or social good, one which yields benefits indiscriminately.
If parks, recreational areas, or other forms of open space
(e.g. pedestrian ways) are provided in conjunction with a
renewal project, several groups benefit: those who utilize the
space, those who g.ze and those who reside or own property in
the vicinity of the amenity. Amenities such as parks are the
classical forms of technological spillovers and Pigou has
remarked:
Uncompensated services are rendered when
resources are invested inppublic parks in
cities; for these, even though the public is
not admitted to them, improve the air of the
neighborhood. 16.
That parks have been provided privately is quite useful
for the cost-benefit analyst. As Chinitz and Tiebout have
indicated, the estimation of B is rendered more tractable
if there exist "alternative private equivalents" for the good
17
or service in question. An operational calculation of B
e
with respect to parks for at least those in contiguous areas
can be made by investigating what individuals who own parks
in cities pay for this privilege. The Grammarcy Park in New
York City is privately and co-operatively owned and the magni-
tude of its financing could be used as a benchmark for determining
the values of parks to those who utilize them. If rents and
property values rise in the surrounding area and if structural
improvements are made, a certain percentage of this change in
values can be attributed to the amenity (pprk in this case)
proVided. As for the gazers and occasional utilizers a value
can bd imputed to the enjoyment they receive in various wtys,
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e.g., by choosing some multiplier-of the time (in money terms)
they spend and transportation costs they incur, in deriving
satisfaction from the amenity. If the park actually increases
the quality of the air in the surrounding area a value can be
imputed by determining who t the cost would have been - in the
absence of the park - to obtain a similar pollution abatement.
"Pollution abatement" leads us to another aspect of B,,
viz., the reduction or elimination of diseconomies. Certain
diseconomies can be eliminated by regulation and entail no
expenditure of public funds. That cities have not chosen to
enforce existing codes or establish necessary regulatory devices
to control diseconomy production is chiefly related to the
distribution of political power, i.e., the causers of diseconomies
have disproportionate political influence. We have in mind
diseconomio.s which are caused by easily identifiable economic
units, e.g. public utilities and slumlords. Since the dis-
economies associated with such units are tolerated by govern-
ments, economists have often suggested that these units should
be subsidized. This.proposal has been disposed of by Pearce and
Sturney:
In the discussions of market solutions to
externality situations, the proponents of the
bargaining solution speak of the third party
"compensating" the creator of the disse-rvice
for hot creating further costs. This usage is
an odd one. Presumably we cannot speak of
compensating someone for not creating further
trouble any more than we could speak of
compensating murderers for not committing a
second or third crime. 18.
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There are other diseconomies whose elimination necessarily
entails more than regulation. Cars cannot simply be banned
from city centers without an alternative means of transport
and facilities for the storage of autos at the periphery of
the center. There are other possibilities, e.g. separation of
pedestrian and vehicular traffic, and mandatory night truck
deliveries. By whatever means accomplished, a drastic reduction
in downtown traffic would have the following effects: diminished
air pollution, noise, urban automobile insurance rates, accidents,
injuries, deaths; possibility of using streets for other purposes
(e.g. parks, stores, arcades), increased pedestrian mobility,
improved health, increased life expectation, increased sa.les,
increased social intera ction, and the preconditions for a beautiful
urban environment. In other words, a radical transformation in
transportation modes would yield extensive B . These B could
e e
all be theoretically imputed a value, but we leave this to the
time when the banning of vehicular traffic is a possible policy.
As we have mentioned, the diminution of diseconomies associatdd
with slums depends upon the kind of project which is undertaken.
If the residents of an eliminated slum are all provided with
standard housing (which reminims standard), municipal expenditures
for fire protection will decrease (assuming a greter than average
fire rate in the slum). However, even if these conditions are
wet, the income level of the displacees has been 4ecreased, and
one can say little a priori about chang-es incoverall expenditures
for police, welfare, or health.
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As for the "collective problem of beauty", the use of
the city for the purposes of selling goods or what Galbraith
terms "the meritriciousness associated with the popular trend
to economic need" - can to a large extent be reduced through
aesthetic standards, i.e. regulation. Thi.s applies to such
things as flashing neon signs, billboards, and other demad
stimulating excesses. It is interesting to note that hanging
signs - to say nothing of flashing ones - are forbidden in
the posh areas of New York City - along Fifth and Park Avenues.
If social control of environment is not only countenanced but
demanded by the "classes", this same control should be the
prerogative of the "masses". If a renewal project must conform
to aesthetic standards, there is the implication that the project
delights and educates onlookers. Similarly, if the project is
innovative in design or construction it provides a rationale
for similar endeavors, which did not appear - in the absence of
the project - to be feasible. In this latter case,. the project
doen not merely yield - frim Ened &ide*s ME (os 4 i since ;t has
made a contribution to knowledge. Therefore a certain percentage
of the benefits of future similar structures can be counted as the
B of the original project. As for the aesthetic considerations
per segan estimation of B ecan be made anabgously to those
imputed to parks for casual users and observers. Or the aesthetic
criterion committee can examine structures for which an admission
is charged for sightseers (e.g. castles) and compare the archi-
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tectural merits of the project with those of buildings which
exact an admission charge. If the project is .1 as beautiful as
(say) the castle, the number of individuals who view the former
can be muntiplied by .1 times the admission charge of the latter
and an imputed value of B can be arrived at.
Lastly we consider B in areas surrounding the renewal
project. If amenities are provided (e.g. parks or new schools),
then the changes in property values in the contiguous areas
are a f~ir measure of B . Even if no amenities are provided
e
in the project, rents and property values may still rise in
the adjacent areas. If this increase is not due solely to a
locational advantage, B are equivalent to the present value
of' enhanced rentals. When rents rise due to B and not to B ,e p
the coefficient which weights the B associated with the
enhanced capital values should be the adjustment factor of
the average of incomes of property owners and tenants, since
both of these gain when rent rises are a consequence of B,.
Alternatively, we might impute half the rise in rents to
property owners and half to tenants, and then multiply B
by the appropriate coefficient.
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V. PRICE EFTECT BENEFITS B
P
The following ends of B are possible in urban renewal:
p
1. With respect to changes in rents and property values if the
supply of one price range of housing is reduced and the supply
of a second price range of housing is increased, landlords in
the former and tenants in the latter will receive B . Since
p
for every B there is a C we cannot determine appriori whether
p p
B - C is positive-.Ittseems iituitively clear that if those
p p
receiving Bp have allower income than those receiving Cp
and hence a higher coefficient that ceteris paribus, B will
'xceed Co. Th6 Oothek' things being egnal" relates to chaege's in
p P
the stock of housing. And again it seems intuitively to be the
case that if the supply of housing is increased then B of
p
tenants will exceed C of landlords. The circumstances under
p
which B do in fact exceed C will be examined analytically in
p p
a later section.
2. If retail stores were demolished, sales in other retail stores
would increase:
a. if the retail stores eliminated served a wider ranre of
consumers than those who were displaced, then sales increase
in the area surrounding the renewv.l site. Also, since competition
is reduced, prices may be raised and sales increase further.
b. if the project area is sufficiently largo, new retail stores
will be constructed. To attract the new stores, the renewal
authority will often eliminate all potentially competitive existing
stores. In this case, the new stores have monopoly privileges and
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the difference between the price of its goods and the price
in competitive circumstances represents BP.
c. The sales of stores.in areas to which displacees and
evictees move increase.
3. We have the following kinds of miscellaneous B .
P
a. If tax concessions are made to entrepreneurs and rentiers
who locate in or near the renewal site, the magnitude of B
p
involved is the difference between taxes actually paid and what
taxes would have been in the absence of a concession.
b. Since relocation agencies often judge "succdas" by
the number of displacees who have become home owners it can
be assumed that displacees are often cajoled into buying homes
although they do not have dufficient means to make payments.
At the same time FHlA loans will often not be made to low-income
19
families. Therefore banks and real estate agents receive B
p
equivalent to the commissions and interest charged to displacees
who (at least) make down-payments on homes.
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VI. B, CONSUMER'S DIEFITS
Our view of B implies subsidization of a good or service.
The subsidy is generally provided by a government but could
be provided privately (e.g. by a non-profit organization). D
measures" the difference. between what the consumers of a good
or service actually pay and what consumers have paid or are
paying for comparable goods or services. Comparability of goods
and services relates to their quality. As in the aesthetic
appraisal of different buildings, judgments about qualitative
differences entail some degree of subjectivity - at least until
a standard is accepted or established. If one aims at a high
degree of specificity, the difficulties of initial qualitative
judgments are diminished. For example, a comparison between the
facilities of a hypothetical public community center and those
of a private or semi-public athletic club could be quite specific,
even down to the quality of the respective basketball courts.
If individuals pay $100 per year for membership at a certain
athletic club or social club whose facilities are 4 times better
than those of a public comunity center which charges $10
per year for membership then the Consumer's bemtfis per member
at the latter is $15 per year.
The typical example of Bc in urban renewal occurs in
housing. The actual subsidy involved in renewal housing (write-
down, subsidized interest rates, etc.) is irrelevent in the
determination of Bc. The question to be asked is: What is the
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rent for units of the same size in buildings of comparable
quality and similar propinquity to the downtown? To answer
this question, the skills of the appraiser will probably
be needed 19, though no conceptual difficulty is posed.
Alternatively, the evaluation of Be might consider the
rent/income ratio for residents of the project (by family
size and age). One-could evaluate the average quality of
units rented by similarly sized and aged families with
identical incomes and rent/income ratios.as those in the
project. Bc will then be seen in terms of the value ascribed
to qualitative differences.
An illustration of the first approach might be the
following: the number of units of a specified size (1) in
* *
the project we denote by a. and the yearly rental per n.
is denoted by r.; n. and r. represent the same concepts
1 1
for units in a building of comparable quality aad location
to the project. The total Bc for a year would be:
** -rt
n.r. - n.r. e x=1
For a specific example, suppose n. refers to the number of
units with a certain number of bedrooms in the project and
* **
R* = 50 (studio), n = 50 (1 bedroom) and n3 = 50 (2 bedrooms).
* * *
ry = $600, rv = $900, and r = $1200. n. is identical with
*
n. and r = $900, r2 $1200 and r3 + $1500. We have:
1 13
n.r. - n.r. = $45,000
and if the social discount rate is chosen as .04,
Bc = 45000 (1 - e~' 0 ) = $43,875.00
.04
1964.
The use of second method (rent/income ratios) to calcu-
late Bc is less precise but conveys more information than the
first approach. For simplicity assume that all units are the
same size, all families have four members and income of $6000
per year with rent/income ratios of .2 in the project. The
second step is to locate similarly sized families with the
same income and rent/income ratio as those in the project.
Next the units in the project are compared with those occupied
by the non-project families. Suppose there are five qualitative
criteria and five possible ranks, 1 being the highest and 5
the lowest, and finally assume that a ranking of 1 is three
times higher than a ranking of 3; 2 is 2.5 hi.gher than one of
5, etc. Remembering that project and non-project refer to
individuals with the same economic and familial characteristics,
we might have a ranking of the following kind:
Project Non-Project
Location l 2
Light and Air 4
Structural Condition 2 3
Aesthetic Value 1 2
Size of Apt. 2 5
By forming ratios of ranks non-project/project summing
through and dividing by 5, *e find that individuals in the
project have 2 times as much quality as those outside through
both groups expend the same amount for rents. A cash value
could be attached to the extrae quality afforded to project
residents. For example, one might say that 2 times better
means a Bc per fCO1e resident of .5 times their annual rent.
165b.
An analysis of this sort might indicate an upper level on
quality of dwellings available for individuals in a given
income group in the absence of housing being provided as a merit
good or without a subsidy of another sort. If a renewal project
which includes housing acts to reduce rents for similarly
priced (i.e. competitive) non-project units, then we must
distinguish between Bc and Up. Bp for residents of the project
is equivalent to the average reduction in rents in competitive
non-project units, i.e. the average difference between the
rent charge for competitive non-project units before and after
renewall The a.&Iculation of Bc for project residents relates
to the post-project situation, and can be looked at in either
of the two ways we have mentioned. That is, Bc can mean the
difference in rents between what project residents pay and
what non-project residents pay for comparable (i.e. equal)
units; or it can measure the difference in quality between
project and non-project units in the mame rent range.
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VII. Ca COMPENSATED COSTS
Ca represent what may be considered the "inputs"
(both fixed and variable) or factor payments which compensate
individuals who in some way contribute to the projects' coming
into being and its continued operation. All Ca are borne
either by the public (in the form of governments or quasi-
governments) or by entrepreneurs (who may be, but are not
generally, the public). It is convenient to look at Ca
chronologically, whereby the early costs are borne entirely
by the public and the later ones mainly by the entrepreneur.
The initial Ca are entirely of an administrative nature,
largely for "survey and planning". Certain adinitstrative
costs occur during the entire period preceeding the completion
of the project. Included are salaries for employees, publicity
costs, rents and improvements in site offices, the materials
used up or depreciated (e.g., typewriters) and the proportion
of ongoing expenses for which the renewal project is responsible
(e.g., phone bills, rent at the main office). Next come the
Ca associated with preparing the site. These include:
1) payments to property owners for land and improvements
2) relocation payments to families and firms displaced
3) payments for site clearance
4) payments to firms, e.g., for legal services, to private
social welfare organizations, and consultants such as archi-
tects, engineers, planners, etc.
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5) expenditures for site improvements
Once the site is prepared, there ensue the costs of constructing
the project. These Ca are borne jointly by the public and the
entrepreneur. The least obvious Ca associated with construction
is that of interest payments. *For purposes of determining the
respective shares of public and entrepreneur, we take the market
rate of interest and subtract from it the interest which the
entrepreneur pays. The proportions remain the sa&me no matter
what discount rate is selected. After completion of the project,
operating costs are the responsibility of the redevelopgr and
other firms (e.g., stores). As we mentioned earlier, Ca may
entail a special adjustment for opportunity costs. This will
be discussed in a latter section.
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VIII. Ce EXTERNAL DISECONOMIES
Since Ce are the opposite of De we have held that the
elimination of the former is an instance of the latter. At
the seme time, a project cans exacebbate existing physical
and social diseconomies or create new ones. With regard to
social ones, take the following plausible occurrences. The
individuals who are displaced or other low-income families
whose rents have risen suffer a decrease in income. They
may commit~crimes, have mental or physical breakdowns, or
school age members of the families may "drop-out" in order
to support their family and will probLAbly take a menial task.
All-,of these occurences represent costs not only to the
individuals involved but to society as a whole. If the
probability that a marginal individual (income-wise) whose
income decreases will in fact impose r;uch a Ce on society
can be determined, the caloulation of Ce is not WA g A,
This ddternination can be made by investigating past increases
in Ce resulting from urban renewal. Suppose that of 200 displaced
individuals the condition of 20 so worsened that society incurred
social costs (it costs from $3000-$5000 per inmate in mental
institutions and prisons) and assume further that the present
value of the Ce is $100,000. To be still more hypotheticalg
assume that the percentage of individuals so affected and
consequent 1Ce'.to society were consistent for projects, say 41.
We could then say that the probability of an individual with a
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low income who is displaced by renewal or whose income decreases
will impose Ce on society is 10f (20/200) and the average
(considering all displacees) Ce incurred by society per dis-
placee is $2000.
As for the physical forms of diseconomies, traffic con-
gestion is the one which will typically be generated. The
provision of parking lots in projects is of course an attraction
to potential residents or employees - who will generally be
able to afford autos. But clearly, each additional automobile
makes a contribution to thelpollution, congestion, and noise
levels. Likewise, the construction of oassive white collar
complexes (epitomuized by the "World Trade Center" in NYC and
Governwent Center in Boston) may actually induce individuals
to drive autos to work. The public transit systems in Boston
and NYC were not designed to handle so many additional thousands
of workers all entering and exiting at the same time and at the
same station. It is highly likely that auto congestion costs
will be less for these workers than the costs of overflowing
subways (buses) and stations (stops).
Aside from congestion, urban renewal does not generally
exacerbate or generate physical diseconomies. The opportunity
costs of not resolving existing diseconomies is of course another
matter.
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IX. Cp PRICE EFFECT COSTS
There are three main kinds of Cp associated with the
corresponding Bp.
1) If the project increases the supply of one prize renge
of housing, average rents in this price range will be less
after renewal than they were before renewal. Therefore land-
lords incur Cp equal to the decrease in average remts times
the number of dwelling units in this price-ra;ge pre-renewal
times the coefficient associated with the median income of
landlords in this price rqnge. If a renewal project decreases
the supply of housing in a given price range, tenants will
incur costs equivalent to the increase in average rents times
the number of pre-renewal units in this price range times the
coefficient associated with the median income of tenants in
this price rangre. One might use the average income of tenants
in a particular price range rather than the median income for
computing the appropriate coefficient since the income variance
for tenants will not be as significant as that for landlords.
For example, one.,does not expect high income tenants in low
rent housing, though there might be both low income and high
income landlordsiin the same price range.
2) Insofar am the renewal project decreases retail competition,
one expects non-competitive pricing. This is especially evident
in renewal projects which are to include new retail stores.
The renewal authority wants to induce retail stores to move
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to the renewal area, and these must be able to afford the
increased rentals. The prospective retail operators will
not be willing to locate in the project unless they are also
assured of a market in the ,urrounding areas, which necessitates
a reduction in the number of stores in and on the periphery
of the renewal site. In order to determine whether monopoly
prices are charged in the new stores, one does not compare
pre-renewal prices with post-renewal prices for retail stores.
The reason for this is the well known phenomenon of merchant
exploitation in the slums. The appropriate comparison should
be made between the prices which the new stores charge and those
charged by similar;stores in competitive circumstances. The
difference will represent Cp for consumers in and near the
renewal site.
If retail prices increase in areas to which displacees
move, we again have Cp. This Cp is borne both by the displacees
and by the pre-renewal re:sidents of the area.
3) If we assume that the revenues collected by the munici-
pality are totally spent to provide goods and services for its
firms and residents and that tax rate times assessed valuation
is the major component of the city's revenue, then any tax
conoessions or abatements which are made in conjunction with
a renewal project impose an additional tax on firms and residents
who have not been granted abatements; this tax is just equal
to the iagnitude of the abatement and/or concession.
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There is one significant Cp which is related with Be.
If the project enhances the value of the surrounding area,
pre-renewal residents may not be able to afford the ehhanced
rentals. If this adjacent Orea was pre-renewal a low rent area
and a middle rent project is constructed, then the rents in
this adjacent area may go up to the middle rent range, and pre-
renewal tenants are indirectly displaced. If a high rent project
were constructed in the midst of a middle rent area, then rents
might rise in this area to the high rent range, and the middle
income tenants would be indirectly displaced. In both theke
instances, Cp represent the moving - and adjustment costs of
those who are displaced as a result of the>Ikind of project
which is undertaken. These costs will be discussed in the next
section, where we consider the costs incurred by those who are
directly displaced by renewal, and who may or may not receive
compensation commensurate to their Cp. Needless to zay, those
who are indirectly displaced are never compensated.
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X. Cu UNDHMCOMPENSATION OF COMPNSATED COSTS
In the last analysis, it is the fact that individuals
can be coerced which makes urban renewal possible. Landlords
and home owners can be forced to sell; firms and residents, to
move. Even were a higher purpose - than appears to be - the
apologia for treating individuals as objects, one would expect -
in a democratic society - an overcompensation of individuals who
are manipulated to achieve this magnum bonum. There is nothing
intrinsic to urban renewal which inexorably must penalize
some (the most vulnerable at that) in order to satisfy others.
Granted that urban renewal uses public monies it does not
follow that double taxation of someis delled for. There are
interesting analogies between the taxation aspects of urban
renewal and of taxation per se which on the normative plane,
are brought out by Musgrave:
It follows fromtthe principle of neutrality
that taxes should be imposed so as to place the
least burden upon whoever is to be taxed. There
should be no excess burden that can be avoided. 21.
Without assenting, to the present instrumental objectives of
urban renewal, one can still discuss the compensation which
ougTht to be accorded those upon whom urban renewal places an
"excess burden".
The Cu for displaced landlords is the least ambiguous.
It should simply be the difference between what the landlord
receives from the renewal authority and the assessed valuation
(or fair market value) of land plus improvement. If the assessors
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are diligent, inflated values via sales to paper companies
and similar ploys should not influence assessed valuation. The
Cu for displaced owner-occupiers is less obvious, since it
includes the Cu for the owner-occupier qua landlord as well
as _ua resident. This latter component of Cu is in principle
the same for all displaced residents. Were an ancillary objective
of renewal to improve the welfare of all displacees by pro-
viding them with betteP quality homes and increased incomes
(by whatever means) there would be Bc and Ca rather than Cu.
Similarly, Be would be more likely than Ce. Needless to say,
this ancillary objectivd is presently non-existent.
Although we discount the notion of 4ability to pay" an
anabgous concept could be accepted. Suppose all displacees
were informed of the post-renewal experiences of past dis-
placees via-a-vis increased rentals, loss of employment,
loss of accessibility to the downtown, to friends, and to
familiar places, and of the sheer cost of moving. Assume
further that each displacee is provided with a counsel. This
takes place before they are in fact displaced. The individuals
could name the amount of money which they believe would
compensate them in view of the experiences of past displacees.
An appropriate figure might be the sum of expected increased
rentals over a five year period, plus total moving costs, plus
a pass on the public transit systems for five years. It is a
figure such as this which a cost-benefit analyst might arrive
at independently of a :articular family's own calculations.
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There have been a number of studies of increased rentals to
inadividuals who have been displaced and these could serve as
a guide.along with an appraisal of the actual supply of low-
rent standard uhits in the metropolitan area. If individuals
are relocated near their former residence, the transit pass
might be unnecessary. It would serve as an ex %nte inducement
toward increased mobility by formerly immobile individuals.
The rise in rents encountered by displacees will generally
be at least partly due to the decrease in housing. In order
to avoid double counting, either one of two procedures might
be followed. (1)'if no compensation is made, then the rise in
rent component of Cu should be adjusted for Bp. That is, if
rents in low-rent units rose by $12 per year and the increased
rental faced by a displacee was $14 a year, then the rise in
rent component of Cu would be f2 per year for that displacee.
(2) If the compensation is to be made or if displacees demand
ex post compensation, then the total $14 should be placed in
Cu (which, if compensation is made, becomes Ca) and Cp should
be reduced by $12.
An alternative way to look at Cu would be to use the
past experiences for ex ante calculations of Cu. Thai is, the
actual physical, psychological, and economic costs incurred by
past displacees or specified family sizes and ages would be
computed and after adjusting for expected rises in the price
level, a figure could be produced which would measure expected
Cu for present displacees.
If one is interested in an ex post determination of Cu,
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one measures the costs incurred by the displacees of the project.
Most of these calculations are not difficult with the exception
of loss of friends and familiar places. This latter could
simply be a measure of transport costs and time expended in
order for the displacees to visit friends and sights from wh'ere
he is presently residing with a frequency approaching that
before displacement. If compensation is to be made, it may
take the form of a five year pass on the transit system.
Toaiassign a figure to the phenomenon of "grieving for a
lost home" , the following procedure might be utilized.
From past experience we calculate the probability that dis-
placement and loss of former friends, enfironment, and home
would induce grief. We then calculate the average duration
of this psychological (though natural) disorder for those
experiencing it. If the probability is .2 and the average
duration is 2 years and if more affluent social groups would
have countered such a disorder bj seeing a psychiatrist bi-
weekly at $30 per session, this component of Cu is .2 x 52
x 30 = $312 per displacee - if the payment is in advance of
displacement.
It is also necessary to make an estimation of the
probability that a family will face a decrease in income
during the adjustment period, that the head of the family isill
lose his (or her) job, and if a new job must be acquired, the
difference between expected and past earning. For displaced
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operators who provide services or sell goods, Cu
represents the difference between what they are paid
for relocating and their actual expenses. It also included
the difference between changes in rent minus changes in
income, if the difference is positive. If they are compelled
to enter a new occupation, then the above Ce is not applicable.
The relevent figure would then be the loss of income during
the readjustment petiod plus former income minus expected
income (say) over a five year period; if this latter difference
is negative, then there is no Cu aside from the interim loss
of income.
With regard to Ce, Cp and Cu we can agree with the
observation by Pearce and Sturmey:
The uncompensated costs do hot differ
intrinsically from those which are com-
pensated. Costs change categories over time;
politicians, social workers, and monarchs
were once unpaid; but are now salaried. 24.
An-enalogous statement could be made for Be, Bp and Bc.
However it is less important from the social standpoint
if benefits are appropriated than if costs are not adequately
compensatedl As Dupuit pointed out, social benefits can be
diminished if an attempt is made to appropriate all benefits
enjoyed (pre-appropriation). But the non- or under- compensation
of costs which are borne by individuals - especially as a.
consequence of a public'undertaking - is unjust and exploitative.
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XI. SOCIAL TIME PREFERINCE
In choosing between alternative r newal projects,
it is first neceszary to take account of all social benefits
and not solely those which are -actually appropriated. However,
even if this is done, there still remains'the possibility
that projects with a short gestation period will dominate
those with a longer gestation period. We have already seen
how this short-run view may inhibit the internalization of
exterralities or the elimination of diseconomies (Ch.1,
sec. 3) For the higher the social rate of discount, the
greater the bias against projects whose return is not
immediately forthcom-ing.
+Wo
Suppose we haveApotential renewal projects, neither of
which seeks the elimiination of diseconomies (i.e., neither of
which will have a delayed gestatioh), we. are then more or
less indifferent to the discountd rate which is chosen. On
the other hand, if a potential project does seek the elimination
of diseconomies, we are not indifferent to the discount rate
which is chosen. The problems associated with physical and
social diseconomies in American cities are severe and liy
to become worse. Their elimination has never been sought
because the pay-off period always seemed too far off 6n the
time horizon. And indeed, the longer their resblution is put
off, the greater will be the anount of resources necessary,
once the costs of further delay begin growing exponentially.
At the present time however, when the "crisis of cities" is
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a clich', projects which may actually terminate the "crisis"
are never considered feasible. The dominant interest groups do
not of course think in terms of discount rates. On the contrary,
discount rates are a reflection of the interests of these
dominant groups. However, it does not follow that discount rates
which are actually chosen are in the interest of most members
of the society.
While other analysts reject the market rate of interest
on the grounds that capital markets are imperfect or economic
growth is proceeding too slowly, we feel that a rejection of
market rates is warranted on the grounds that the most pressing
domestic problems entail expenditures whose returm may not be
forthcoming for a generation. We do not accept the fatalistic
views that the poor "are always with us" or that polluted air
and congestion are eternal attributes of cities. If a project
Wns at the elimination of diseconomies, it and alternatiVes
should be discounted at a rate which is 1/2 to 1/4 that of
the market rate of interest. The basic premise is that the
possibility for resolving important social problems should
not be jettisoned simply because such problems are not amenable
to resolution in the short-run.
Formulae for expressing discounted present value can take
three general forms depending on whether the benefits are
constant, discontinuous, or continuous (but not constant). If
benefits accrue at a constant yearly rate $/yr), the chosen
rate is less crucial than if benefits are discontinuous or
continuous (but not constant), Assuming that all these formulae
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express net benefits (i.e. discounted benefits less discounted
costs), net benefits at a constant yearly rate appear in the
following form:
Net Benefits = fert dt =, (1 - e-rx)
where a is given in $/year, r is the discount rate, t is
time and x is the last pay-off period.
If net benefits accrue in a discontinuous manner, say $O
for the first year, $100 in each of the next five years,
$175 in the sixth year, etc., we have the usual type of present
value formula:
Net Benefits= b b b b1 2 + 13 +... n
(1+r) (1+r)2 (1+r) 3 (1+r)"
or more generally:
Net Benefits b.
(1+n)d
where b. has a specified value for each j.
In this discontinuous cases, the time profile for benefits is
crucial and one must be concerned with the discount rate.
For the continuous case, we consider a function with a
perpetual though possibly ddlayed met benefit stream:
F (t) 1 - a a is an integer (say) between 1
and 10
Net Benefits F(t) e-rt dt
The year in which this project begins yielding benefits depends
on the value of a. A higher value of a in conjunction with-a
high value of r might preclude such a project. It is % project
with b benefit stream of this form, which only begins paying off
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when tya and then approaches a unity limit, which could be
quite substantial if Be and -Ce are involved, aqd yields
in any case a perpetual benefit stream.
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XII. SOCIAL OPPORTUNITY COSTS
There seem to be two levels of social opportunity costs
in urban renewal. There are the opportunity costs which
ought to be included in the cost-benefit analysis calculation
itself and there are those which .should relate the-' project to
opportunities foregone. The former represent opportunity
costs which adjust C upwardly or downwardly with respect to
actual expendituresfor the project. The adjustments are most
conveniently included with Ca. An upward adjustment is called
for if the Renewal Authority does not take bids on a project
and confers monopsony privileges upon an entrepreneur or
if the entrepreneur is aimonopsonist. Ca will then be
excessive and the fact that the Renewal Agency abets a
monopsonist or encourages monopsony entails an additional
cost. Similarly, if the Renewal Authority chooses the
redeveloper through non-competitive means, one assumes
that the costs to the public (in terms of write-down and tax
abatements and the likelihood of graft) will be excessive,
and an upward adjustment in Ca is again called for. The
general assumption in these upward adjustments is that
monopolists and monopsonists necessarily behave in an anti-
social manner, and any governmental support of these groups
imposes costs on society.
As an example of a downward adjustment in Ca, consider
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the case of an urban renewal project which oploys (pre-
renewal) unemployed individuals, of which there is no shortage
in American slums. The wage paid to thec. individuals overstates
the opportunities foregone had they not been employed. in the
renewal project. Additionally, if they acquire skills or
uni6n membership as a consequence of their employment in
the project, an additional contribution has been nad-e to
social welfare. The use of accounting - or shadow - wage to
downwardly adjust the actual wage paid might be of the following
kind:
money wage
s/hr.
Accounting wage
$/hr.
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The second level of opportunity costs expresses
whether or not x project is or was worth undertaking. This
level has two characteristic , both of which have already
been mentioned. The first relates to the effects of instru-
mental objectives on the metropolitan area, andi hence on the
welfare of the entire society. If the subsidy element imiplied
in urban renewal was utilized solely to influence locational
decisions of households or firms, we have prima facie evidence
that no net benefits resulted from the urban renewal project.
In particular, if the urban renewal project subsidized non-
efficient or monopolistic firms or induced firms to locate in
the city on the basis of write-downs and tax-abaterients whereas
in the absence of these subsidies, the firms would have remained -
or located - elsewhere, the renewal ;roject probably entails
a net decrease in.social welfare. An analogous argument can
be -ade regarding household moves, especially where renewal
funds are used to induce middle and above income families
to leafe the community in which they presently reside. In this
case, the move causes increases in the tax-rates or decreases
in the level of services in the communities which are unable
to subsidize families for want of renewal monies. More generally,
it: is not in the interest of society that renewal funds be used
salely to alter locational decisions.
The second characteristics of thin level of opportunity
costs is the most important one. Since it is agreed that some
form of urban renewal is needed, the social opportunity costs of
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a given project are equivalent to the expected met benefits
of the best 4lternative project. Throughout this paper-we
have maintained that the best projects are those which eliminate
physicalcand social diseconomies. It remains with the individual
cost-benefit analyst (or social critic) to propose those
projects best able to realize the long-term goal of revivifying
cities. Social opportunity costs are then an implied criticism
of the present operations of renewal; the higher the social
opportunity costs, the better is the proposed project, or the
more short-sighted is the actual project.
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XIII. EFFECTS ON CITY FINANCES
Our schema for cost-benefit calculation incorporates
potential improvements in thellevel of city services due to
enhanced revenues or decreases in outlays for services
associated with poverty. Since city revenues are largely
based on property values, all of Ba and some components of Be
will express gains for the city's financial position. The
other components of Be are an indication of decreases for
certain services related to physical and social diseconomies.
It does not follow of course that a particular project actually
improves the financial condition of a city.
Renewal will cause decreases in the city's revenue on
several counts. There is a time gap between the demolition of
tax-paying properties and the completion of the project; there
are tax-abatements and write-downs (some of which come fromrthe-
city); there are decreases in the value of property'in other
sections of the city; there are the costs of environmental
improvements and administration, and (possibly) the transfer
of city property (e.g., streets) to the redeveloper; and
finally, there are increased welfare and related expenditures
for families who have been made worse off as a result of
renewal.
An even more important question than whether a renewal
project enhances the short-run financial positionoof a city
is whether the goal is itself not merely a "red herring".
Some observers feel that the goal Ji an increased tax base
militates against the structural changes, e.g., some form of
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metropoUitan government, which are needed to make cities
viable. We come to the same conclusion for different reawons.
Those projects capable of raising the tax-base in the short-run
are precisely those which are antithetical to the goal of
eliginating physical and social diseconomies.
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The Relation between Price Effect Benefits (Bp) and Price
Effect Costs (Cp) with respect to changes in the Supply
of Housing &s a consequence of Urban Renewal
We assume three rent ranges of housing: low rent,
middle rent, and high rent; and five income groups. We have
two time periods, pre-renewal and post-renewal. When there
is no specification as to time period, hi represents the number
of dwelling units in rent range i, i = 1, 2, 3; where i-ent-of 1< 2 3.
Total housing for all three rent ranges is given by:
h = hl + h2 + h3  (1)
The number of units in hach.,of the rent ranges hi is:
A
h = . hij (2)
where hij is the jth unit in rent range i. When a time
specification is given, then HI = hi pre-renewal, and Hi =
hi post-renewal. Hence:
H* H. + H2 + H3 (3)
H = HI + H 2 + H3  (4)
The average rent in ho is represented by ri vhich is
determined by:
a
ri = 1 rij (5)
h j=l
wHsi-b rij is the rent of the jth unit in hi. When a
time specification is given, Ri = ri pre-renewal and
Iti = ri post-renewAl. Total rent pre-renewal is :
R* R H + H*2 + It3 H*3 (6)
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Total rent post-renewal is:
R= i Hi + T2 H2 + R3 H3 (7)
*
We assume that whenever R > Ri, then Hi < Hi, and
vice versa. This is a reasonable assumption, since we are
only dealihg with Price Effect Benefitsaid Costs; i.e., only
with price changes induced by changes in supply. Whether
or not Bp is forthcoming for tenants in hi is determined
by the difference ( Ri- ), which is abbreviated in the
following way:
(l - Ni ) = A(8)
If Ai ? 0 there are BP for tenants and Cp for landlords, while
if Ab i < 0 there are BP for landlords and Cp for tenants. The
absolute change in average rents in hi is symbolized by
IA!I . If4 i ; 0, then tenants receive Bp amounting to:
JA (Hi) (xi) = By for tenants when A i'P o (9)
where xi is the coefficient associated with the median income
of tenants in hi. There? will be Cp for landlords amounting
to:
18 i (H*) (yi) = Cp for landlords when A i'7 0 (10)
where yi is the coefficient with the median income of landlords
uinhi. If x'7yi then By will exceed Cp since HiTHi . If
xi< yi then whether or not Bp' Cp is determined by how much
larger Hi is than
On the other hand, ifAi4<0, there will be Bp for landlords
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amounting to:
(i) (yi) = 3p for landlords when Ai<o (11)
And there will be Cp for tenants amounting to:
L8 (i) (Xi) = Cp for tenants when Ai<o (12)
Whether A ii0, it is seen that hi associated with
tenants is always greater than the hi associated with landlords.
The reason for this is straightforward. With a decrease in
the number of dwellihg units, the same number of post-renewal
tenants are in need of housing as yer6-pre-reiewal, whike.a
decrease of the number of units in hi for landlords means they
have changed the property's use or sold the property. The Bp
to post-renewal landlords in hi is the !difference in rents
which they charged before and after renewal times the number
of units which so increased, ie, the post-renewal units.
If the number of units in hicis greater after renewal than
it was before, the gain to tenants is proportional to the
number of units which cost less after renewal than they did
or would have before renewal. The additional units cannot
represent a loss to landlords since they did not exist
pre-renewal, i.e., the loss to landlords can only take
account of the number of units whose rents actually decreased,
i.e., the pre-renewal units. Looked at another way, -the owners
of the additional units do, not suffer any Cp because these
units rent for less that did domparable units pre-renewal.
In order to calculate whether BpoCp, we multiply
I Au and the determinant whose elements consist of hi and income
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Coefficients. Position of elements in the determinant
is given by the following rules:
Hi always appears in position (1,i). (13)
H always appears in position (1,2). (14)
If A i'7 o, xi appears in position (2,2) and yi appears
in position (2,1). (15)
If A i< 0, xi appears in position (2,11) and yi appears
in position (2,2) (16)
In other words, under (15),there are B for tenants and Cp
for landlords; while under (16) there are By for landlords and
Cp for t4nants. If L i7 0 for all hi, then Bp'),Cp only if:
H1 H H2 'I H3 H*
71 1 / 7 2 2 X2 7+ 3 Y 3  x3 
0
Now supposing that 41<0; 42, 43'0. Then in order for
Bp>Cp, the following must be')0. (Note that we apply((16)
to the first #eterminant and (15) to the other two.)
Hi H* + 2  H H3 H
l 71 7 2 7 3
Now consider2 2 + l A H ; 3 1 Y3 X3 0
Now consider a numerical example of this last case. An
urban renewal project has demolished 1000 units of hi and
replaced them with 500 units of h3 . Rents rise in hi by $36/unit/year
and drop by $12/unit/year in h 3 . Assuming some .P4ohe oy. mnove. ido
h3, , rents drop in h2 by $3/unit/year, although the number
of units in h2 is the same before and after renewal. Finally,
assume that the median income of tenants in hi puts them in
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Incomie Group 8; those in h2 are in Income Group 3; and those
ix h3 are in Income Group 4. The aorresponding Income Groups
for landlords are 3, 4, and 5. We have:
1= 36 2 = 12 JA 3 = 3
xi = 1.5
2= 1
X3 = .75
yi = 1
Y2 = .75
y3 = .5
The number of units pre - and post - renewal in each of the hi is:
H = 10900f.
H2 = 80000
H3 = 6000
Hi = 9000
H2 = 8000
H3 = 6500
And:
9000 100001
36
1.5
8000 8000 6500
+ 3 1 . 51+ 12 ) 5
- $187,500.
So in this example, Bp ( CP.
6000
.75
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A Fortran Program, discounting and adjusting costs and
benefits to different income groups
The following Fortran IV program presents a rapid and generil
method for deterdiiing the income group of a fimily'acc6rding *
to its size, age, and yearly income. After the income groupt
of a family which receives one or more of the eight benefits or
costs is determined, these areeadjisted by th6 appropriate
coefficient.t The relation between'size,'age, and yearly income
of families and the corresponding income groups and coefficients
is presented in a table of page 92. Oinally, the discounted
net benefits to all and each income group is calculated and
printed.
We have had to make several assumptions in writing the program,
but all of these could be changed without vitiating the general
form of the program. These assuzptions are:
(1) The 'sgnitude.of costs and benefits to all families is
known: If only an unbiased sample of costs and benefits
to families were knowin, the net discounted benefits accruikg
to each income group would be determined by multiplying the
sample's costs and benefits by: 1/sample as a fraction of total
families in the income group; which, in the case of a 20% sample
would be 1/.2= 5.
(2) Benefits and costs are assumed to accrue at a constant rate
of $/year. Each card lists the benefits and costs to
a'f&!ily for one year, which accrue at the rame rate during
the whole time period, beginning with the first year. It was
also assumed that Ca all appeear at the outset of the project,
and are therefore equal to market prices for that year. Cu
are incurred for five years, and are not discounted. All other
costs and berefits ensue for a forty year period. The
discount rate' used in the program is .03.
(3) On each data card is eight pieces of information, each all6ted
ten columns. In the first field of ten column appear the
size Bf the family. We used the following code:
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-1 = family of one under 65 years of age
1 = family of one over 65 years of kage
-2 = family of two; head under 65 years of age
2 = family of two; head over 65 years of age
3 = family of three
4 = family of four
5= fimily of five
6= family of six
7= family of seven or more
In the program, I stands for the numbers denoting family size. In
the second field appears yearly income for family, for which we used
the variable K. The next eight fields are composed of the
different costs and benefits:
Cost or Benefit
Ba
Be
Bp
Be
Ca
Ce
Cp
Cu
Read equivalent
x(1)
X(2)
X(3)
X(4)
X(5)
X(6)
X(7)
X(8)
The program appears on the following three pagen.
Field
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
DIMENSION X(8),
DIMENSION BA(5)
DIMENSION B(20)
EQUIVALENCE (B(
l(C(1l),CA(1)),(C
DATA BC/40*0./
READ(5,5) I,K,(
FORMAT (218,8F8
BNET(5)
,BE(5),BP(5),BC(5),CA(5),CE(5),CP(5),CU(5)
, C(20)
1),BA(1)
(6) ,CE( 1
X(J) ,J=l
.0)
),(B(6),BP(1)) ,(Bill),BE(1)),(B(16),BC(1)),
)),(C(11)tCP(1)),(C(16),CU(1))
,8)
N=I+3
GO TO(12,10,96,11,13,14,15,16,17,18),N
10 IF(K.LT.1885) GO TO 19
IF (K.LT.2828)"GO TO 20
IF(K.LT.3531) GO TO 21
IF(K-7062) 22,23,23
11 IF(K.LT.1745) GO TO 19
IF(K.LT.2618) GO TO 20
IF(K.LT.3273) GO TO 21
IF(K-6546) 2
12 IF(K.LT.2715
IF(K.LT.4073
IF(K.LT.5091
IF(K-10182)
13 IF(K.LT.2460
IF(K.LT.3690
IF(K.LT.4613)
IF(K-9226) 22,
14 IF(K.LT.3160)
2,23,23
GO TO
GO TO
GO TO
22,23,23
GO TO
GO TO
GO TO
23,23
GO TO
1
5
19
20
21
19
20
21
19
.4
IF-(K.LT.4740) GO TO 20
IF(K.LT.5925) GO TO 21
IF(K-11850) 22,23,23.
15 IF(K.LT.4000) GO TO 19
IF(K.LT.6000) GO TO 20
IF (K.LT.7500) GO TO 21
IF(K-15000) 22,23,23
16 IF(K.LT.4675) GO TO 19
IF(K.LT.7013) GO TO 20
IF(K.LT.8766) GO TO 21
IF(K-17532) 22,23,23
17 IF(K.LT.5250) GO TO 19
IF(K.LT.7875) GO TO 20
IF(K.LT.9844) GO TO 21
IF(K-19688) 22,23,23
18 IF(K.LT.6395) GO TO 19
IF(K.LT.9593) GO TO 20
IF(K.LT.11991) GO TO 21
IF(K-22182) 22,23,23
19 INDEX=1
FACTOR=2.
GO TO 69
20 INDEX=2
FACTOR=1.5
GO TO 69
21 INDEX=3
FACTOR=1.
GO TO 69
22 INDEX=4
FACTOR=.75
GO TO 69
23 INDEX=5
FACTOR= 5
69 BA(INDEX)=BA(INDEX)+X(
BE(
BP(
BC(
CA(
CE(
CP(
CU(
INDEX)=BE(
INDEX)=BP(
INDEX)=BC(
INDEX)=CA(
INDEX)=CE(
INDEX)=CP(
INDEX)=CU(
1)*FACTOR
INDEX)+X(2)*FACTOR
INDEX)
INDEX)
INDEX)
INDEX)
INDEX)
INDEX)
+X(
+X(
+X(
+X(
+X(
+X(
3)*FACTOR
4)*FACTOR
5)
6)*FACTOR
7)*FACTOR
8)*FACTOR
GO TO 1
96 CONST=1.-EXP(-1.2)
DO 9 I=1,5
BNET(I)=(((BA( I)+BE(I)+BP(I))/.03)*CONST)-(5.*CU(I)+(((CP(I)+CE(I)
1)/.03)*CONST)+CA(I))
9 CONTINUE
C, BNETI AND BNET(I) DENOTE NET BENEFITS TO INCOME GROUP I.
BNETX=BNET(1)+BNET(2)+BNET(3)+BNET(4)+BNET(5)
WRITE(6,99) BNET(1),BNET(2),BNET(3),BNET(4),BNET(5),BNETX
99 FORMAT('1BNET1='F10.2/' BNET2='F10.2/' BNET3='FlO.2/' BNET4='F10.2
1/' BNET5='F10.2/'OTOTAL NET BENEFITS ='F12.2)
STOP
END
QJ
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